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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction and Overview 
The goal of the present chapter is to introduce and provide the reader with key 
concepts to go through the present work. All of the researches presented in the 
dissertation focus on people's risky behaviors. In order to shed light on mechanisms 
underlying this phenomenon, I point out how people's emotions (i.e., anticipated 
emotions, integral emotions, anticipated regret, and emotion regulation strategies) 
and individuals' goal-oriented self-regulation (i.e., regulatory mode; see chapter 2, 
for more explanations) affect risky behaviors. For this purpose: first, I briefly 
introduce the phenomenon studied (i.e., risk taking) as well as some advanced 
behavioral measures designed to assess real-world risk taking in controlled 
laboratory environments. Second, I present how researchers have started to take into 
the account emotions in order to better investigate and comprehend people's risky 
behaviors; and I also introduce different types of emotions which are thought to 
affect individual differences in risky choices. Third, I highlight some features of the 
regret feeling since it is considered as the emotion most studied in behavioral 
decision-making, experimental economics and related research fields (Roese & 
Summerville, 2005; Shimanoff, 1984). Finally, I point out the relevant role of 
emotion regulation strategies (Gross & John, 2003) in increasing the explanatory 
power of current models of decision-making under risk (see chapters 3 and 4, for 
more explanations). 
Risk taking processes 
Most decisions in everyday activities include risk taking, because the 
consequences of alternative courses of action are rarely known with certainty. 
Indeed, one rarely knows the outcomes with certainty when making daily decisions 
in domains such as health, economic, social and so forth. Broadly speaking, risky 
behavior is defined as a type of behavior that can have negative consequences for  
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the self or for others. Risky choices are a central topic in judgment and decision-
making (J/DM) research and related field (e.g., economics, psychology, health 
psychology and medicine). Since first proposed by Swiss mathematician Daniel 
Bernoulli (1700/1782), the “expected utility” (EU) framework served as the 
normative benchmark for researchers in behavioral decision making to show how 
actual human decisions are made differently from mathematical reasoning and 
computations. Model based on EU assumes that people choose between alternative 
courses of action by assessing the desirability (i.e., utility) of each action’s potential 
outcomes and linearly weighting those utilities by their probability of occurring. 
The normative status of the EU model was enhanced by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s (1944) theoretical developments that it could be derived from a 
primitive, intuitively appealing set of axioms, such as the transitivity of preferences 
axiom, by which if option A is preferred over option B, and B is preferred to C, then 
A should be preferred to C. In addition, the model's assumption that decisions are 
based on EU rather than on expected value gives it a descriptive appeal as well. For 
instance, it assumes that the difference in displeasure (i.e., utility) between losing 
$11 and losing $12 is not necessarily equal to the difference in displeasure between 
losing $111 and losing $112 (i.e., though the difference in value is $1 in both cases). 
Nevertheless, empirical evidence (e.g., Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997; 
Mellers & MacGraw, 2001) has documented many behavioral phenomena that are 
inconsistent with both predictions of the EU model and basic axioms. Many of these 
“inconsistencies” can be attributed to unrealistic assumptions about the 
determinants of anticipated emotions and the influence of incidental and/or integral 
emotions on risky choices. Thus, several models have accounted for some of these 
“inconsistencies” by making more realistic assumptions about the determinants of 
the emotions occurring in making risky decisions (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; 
Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997; 
Mellers & MacGraw, 2001; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Furthermore, some 
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authors (Weber & Johnson, 2009) suggested that economics paradigms (i.e., risk 
tasks) adopted to study human behavior under risk fail in predicting risk taking 
behavior in naturalistic risk taking; because they often do not elicit participants' 
emotionally engaging and they also lack a good external validity. A recent review 
(Weber & Johnson, 2009) pointed out that an important feature of tasks, which are 
meant to assess risk taking in laboratory settings, consists of capturing not only 
static and cognitive dimensions of risk taking processes but also engage dynamic 
and affective dimensions (e.g., exhilaration and specific emotions, such as hope or 
fear which accompany naturalistic risk taking). In addition, tasks designed to assess 
people's risk taking demonstrated reliable empirical associations with naturalistic 
risk taking behaviors in healthy and clinical samples as well as they allow us to 
distinguish between them in order to show a good external validity. These features 
are really relevant to bridge the gap between laboratory settings and real-world risk 
taking because participants faced with the risk task may vary systematically their 
risky behavior as a function of a number of state variables, such as negative and 
positive affect or their motivation, just as naturalistic context. Luckily, some recent 
works in clinical psychology and neuroscience (e.g., Lejuez et al. 2002; Brand et al., 
2005; Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009) provide us new advanced 
behavioral paradigms (i.e., Balloon Analogue Risk Task, BART; Lejuez et al. 2002; 
and Columbia Card Task, CCT; Figner et al. 2009) that better enhance the 
prediction of real-world risk taking behaviors, because these tasks not only show 
good external validity, but they also are emotionally engaging (Aklin, et al., 2005; 
Hunt et al., 2005; Lejuez et al., 2002, 2003; Lejuez et al., 2007; Skeel, Neudecker, 
Pilarski, & Pytlak, 2008; Bornovalova et al., 2009; Weber & Johnson, 2009; Mishra, 
Lalumière, & Williams, 2010; Swogger, Walsh, Lejuez, & Kosson, 2010; 
MacPherson, Reynolds, Daughters, Wang, Cassidy, Mayes, & Lejuez, 2010; 
Schonberg, Fox, & Poldrack, 2010). Keeping in mind these evidences, in the 
present work, I chose three advanced behavioral measures of risk: First (i.e., chapter 
Predicting Risky Choices 
 7 
2), I adopted the BART that involves immediate feedback about outcomes of 
participants' decisions because choices' feedback has been considered crucial to 
study the role of regret in J/DM research (see the next chapter for more details about 
this risk task). Second (i.e., chapter 3), I was interested in assessing people's risk 
taking under deliberative processes. I then adopted the cold version of Columbia 
Card Task (Figner et al. 2009; see chapter 3, for more details) that was specifically 
developed to estimate risk taking when occurring decisions made with the 
involvement of mainly "cold" cognitive processes. Finally (i.e., chapter 4), I focus 
on risky choices under high emotional arousal processes. I then adopted the hot 
version of CCT (Figner et al. 2009; see chapter 4, for more details) that was 
specifically designed to trigger substantial involvement of affective decision-
making processes.   
An important feature of these tasks consists in triggering different types of 
emotions (e.g., anticipated, integral emotions). For example, the hot version of CCT 
predominantly triggers integral emotions (see also Figner et al. 2009; Panno, 
Lauriola, & Figner, 2012). I then suggest that - based on specific task features - we 
may adopt one which most reflects the peculiarities of our study. Next, I introduce 
how different emotions' types (i.e., integral, anticipated and incidental), affect risky 
choices. Finally, I also consider crucial to take into the account motivational and 
emotion regulation factors to shed light on mechanisms underlying decision-making 
processes under risk. 
Emotions meet decision-making processes. 
As a reaction to the dominance of behaviorism in the middle of the past century, 
the cognitive revolution arises within psychology (e.g., see Miller, 2003). The 
cognitive revolution emphasized a view of human cognition as information 
processing (Neisser, 1976). As a result, a primary goal of cognitive psychology was 
to explore “the way man collects, stores, modifies, and interprets environmental 
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information or information already stored internally” (Lachman et al., 1979, p. 7). 
This approach generally excluded emotions as it was partially inspired by the 
computer metaphor. Although there has been significant debate over the past 30 
years about the appropriate role for emotion in the study of cognition (Lazarus, 
1984; Neisser, 1976; Zajonc, 1984), until recently these different approaches to the 
study of human decision and behavior rarely overlapped. Nevertheless, based on 
previous studies (e.g., see Le Doux, 1996) it has become increasingly apparent that 
emotions and cognition interact in making decisions and shaping the human 
behavior. Indeed, for a long time, emotions were thought of having a detrimental 
influence on decisions, leading the decision maker away from normative 
predictions. But it is worth nothing that, the detrimental emotions' influence on 
decisions occur, in some cases, where emotional states are strong enough to 
completely overcome cognitive processes, such as in the cases of phobias or 
addictions (Baron, 1992; Loewenstein, 1996). Luckily, in the previous decade, an 
influential research focus has been the study of emotions in decision making, as part 
of what has been called the emotions revolution. The emotions revolution of the past 
decade or so has tried to correct cognitive research overemphasis by documenting 
the prevalence of affective processes, depicting them as automatic and essentially 
effort-free inputs that orient and motivate adaptive behavior (Weber & Johnson, 
2009). 
Based on emotion revolution's findings, I consider three types of emotions which 
are thought affect risky decision making (see also next chapters for more details): 
a) Integral emotions. This type occurs when the emotional state is induced by 
the situation itself, for example by the stimuli presented in a task or by 
positive or negative feedback experienced during a risk task. In those 
cases of integral emotion, there is an emotional state that results from the 
contents presented in the cognitive task (Blanchette & Richards, 2010). 
For instance, in the process of deciding whether to purchase a stock, the 
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potential investor may experience immediate fear if s/he see that the stock 
is losing value. 
b) Incidental emotions. These are emotions that are present at the time of a 
decision but are unrelated to the decisional process itself (Lerner & 
Keltner, 2000). Incidental affect may be induced affective states (moods) 
that are transient in nature or more stable personality differences in 
affective traits (e.g., anxiety) that are not evoked by the target materials. 
For instance, a radio program playing in the background may trigger 
positive or negative emotions when the investor is purchasing a stock. 
c) Anticipated emotions. These are emotions which the decision-maker 
believes that will be occurring after the selection of one of the alternatives. 
‘‘Anticipated emotions are a component of the expected consequences of 
the decision. They are ‘cognitive’ emotions that are expected to occur 
when outcomes are experienced” (Loewenstein et al., 2001, p. 269). For 
instance, if Anna is a potential investor, who have decide whether to 
purchase a stock, she might imagine some potential emotions such as 
regret and relief that she might experience if she did not purchase the 
stock and its price either rose or fell. A lot attention has been paid to this 
type of emotions occurring in decision-making processes (Loewenstein & 
Lerner, 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Schwarz, 2000). 
 
 
Specific emotion in decision-making processes: Regret feeling.  
Several works (e.g., Mellers, et al, 1997; Nordgren, van der Pligt, & van 
Harreveld, 2007; Richard, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996; Richard, de Vries, & van 
der Pligt, 1998) focused on regret to increase the predictive power the decision-
making models. Let me introduce the regret emotion (see chapter 2, for more 
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details). Broadly speaking, every day people make thousands of decisions which 
include several activities ranging from which products to buy for dinner to whether 
to purchase a stock. Each of these activities engenders a potential regret, therefore 
this emotion is widely considered in decision-making research. Although the study 
of regret originated from economics (e.g., Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982), 
and psychology (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Connolly 
& Zeelenberg, 2002; Zeelenberg, & Beattie, 1997; Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der 
Pligt, & de Vries, 1996; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, van der 
Pligt, Manstead, van Empelen, & Reinderman, 1998; Zeelenberg, 1999), one can 
find many examples of regret works in many different domains, such as marketing 
(Inman, Dyer, & Jia, 1997; Simonson, 1992), organizational behavior (Goerke, 
Moller, & Schulz-Hardt, 2004; Maitlis & Ozcelik, 2004), cross-cultural psychology 
(Gilovich, Wang, Regan, & Nishina, 2003), medicine (Brehaut et al., 2003; 
Djulbegovic, Hozo, Schwartz, & McMasters, 1999), law (Prentice & Koehler, 
2003), health psychology (Chapman & Coups, 2006; Connolly, & Reb, 2005; 
Richard, Van der Pligt, & De Vries, 1996), and neuroscience (e.g., Camille et al., 
2004). 
Zellenberg and Pieters (2007) claim that regret is an unpleasant feeling triggered 
when people is realizing or imagining (i.e., anticipated regret) that their current 
situation would have been better, if only they had decided differently. It is worth 
nothing that, regret is a backward looking emotion signaling an unfavorable 
evaluation of a decision. Kahneman claims that regret can also be considered an 
emotion where cognitive processes meet affective processes, because it is the 
emotion triggered by counterfactual thinking. Indeed, it has been considered as an 
emotion strongly marked cognitively which is omnipresent in the people's life 
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986). The anticipated regret's key feature consists of 
experiencing the outcome of a decision when is materialized, but not at the moment 
of choice, at the moment of choice it is only cognitions about future emotions. 
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Based on these features, it is easy to imagine how regret shapes and leads the 
behavior. Moreover, these features are particularly emphasized when people are 
faced with risky decisions. Therefore, the anticipated regret is also considered 
crucial in understanding the people's risk taking. Keeping in mind these features, I 
consider regret as a key variable between decision maker's self-regulation and 
human risky behavior. In the chapter 2, I focus on regret since I attempt to show his 
trajectory (i.e., how regret forms from regulatory mode; and in turn, affects the risky 
behavior). 
Considering previous studies' findings which focus on the role of the emotions in 
making risky decision, we have both empirical and theoretical motives to consider 
that emotions should be included among the scientific interests of those 
investigating risky behaviors (Lopes, 1987; Lopes & Oden, 1999; Mellers et al., 
1997; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). I am strongly confident that by including 
emotions in decision-making models their explanation power is increased. 
 
Taking into the account the people's emotion regulation to explain 
their risk taking. 
Although it has been showed how emotions affect risky behaviors. It is worth 
nothing that, people are not at the whim of their emotions. Emotion regulation 
strategies may affect (i.e., upregulating or downregulating) the experienced 
emotions (e.g., anticipated emotions triggered before to take a risky choice), which 
in turn, affect risky decision making. Thus, people can use a number of emotion 
regulation strategies designed to alter their emotional reactions, which in turn, affect 
risky behaviors. Emotion regulation is widespread in our daily lives, it is possible 
that it might actually mediate the involvement of emotion in risky decision making. 
Most of the previous studies, which investigated the relationship between emotions 
and risky decision making, have not controlled for people's emotion regulation 
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strategies (see also Loewenstein et al., 2001; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Lopes, 
1987; Lopes & Oden, 1999; Mellers et al., 1997). Therefore, the emotions effect on 
risky decision making, ranging from affecting human choices by several types of 
bias to interfering with information processing, may actually be mediated by 
emotion regulation strategies, such as cognitive reappraisal, expressive suppression 
and many others (Gross & John, 2003). Based on this issue have been devised some 
hypotheses of the present work (see chapters 3 and 4, for more details). 
 
Overview 
Based on these premises – in the present dissertation – First, I introduce a 
comprehensive series of three studies (i.e., chapter 2) demonstrating whether and 
how individuals' regulatory modes affect individual differences in taking risky 
choices. I further focus on the role of anticipated regret to explain how it arises from 
regulatory mode, and in turn, affects risk taking. In keeping with this view, the 
present work sheds light on mechanisms underlying the relationships among 
decision-maker's regulatory mode, anticipated emotions and risky behaviors. 
Second (i.e., chapter 3), I introduce a relatively new theory studied in decision-
making research (Emotion Regulation theory; ER, Gross & John, 2003), 
demonstrating how ER strategies adopted from people predict risky choices 
occurring in deliberative processes (i.e., processes which predominantly involve 
anticipated emotions). But the present work does more than this. Indeed, the chapter 
4 shows how situationally induced ER strategies affect risky choices occurring in 
decision processes related to high emotional arousal level (i.e., processes which 
predominantly involve integral emotion) as well as demonstrating how a personality 
variable (i.e., negative focus on potential outcome; see chapter 4, for more details) 
moderates the relationship between ER strategy and risky choices.  
The experiments presented in the following chapters offer solid evidence of the 
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mediating role of anticipated regret between decision-maker's regulatory modes and 
risky behavior. Moreover, robust evidence is showed on mechanisms underlying the 
relationship between ER strategies and risky decision making. Thus, we can claim 
that the quality of a decisional output is not only influenced by integral or 
anticipated emotions, but also by the effectiveness the regulatory strategies 
employed to control the affective states.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Between self-regulation and risk Taking: The mediating role of anticipated 
regret 
Although there is literature showing that regret influence risk taking behavior 
and that regulatory modes affect the regret experience, no studies so far investigated 
the interplay of regulatory modes and anticipated regret in risky decision making. In 
Study 1, anticipated regret was induced to test the causal effect on performance 
level (i.e., risky choices) in the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). In Study 2 
and 3, to test the regulatory modes' effect on BART's performance level, assessment 
and locomotion modes were both experimentally induced and measured as chronic 
individual differences, respectively. One’s degree of anticipated regret was 
measured in both studies 2 and 3 to test the mediating role of anticipated regret. 
Study 1 showed that people in the anticipated regret condition exhibited a lesser 
BART's performance level than control participants. Study 2 demonstrated that 
regulatory modes affected anticipated regret, which in turn, had an effect on BART's 
performance level. Study 3 replicated study 2's findings providing evidence that 
anticipated regret also mediated the effect of chronic individual differences in 
regulatory modes. I concluded that the interplay of regulatory modes and 
anticipated regret influenced the amount of risky choices in a dynamic risk task and 
disclosed mechanisms underlying this relation. Implications for behavioral decision 
making and emotion research are discussed. 
 
This chapter is based on Panno, A., Lauriola, M., & Pierro, A. Between self-
regulation and risk taking: The mediating role of anticipated regret. Manuscript in 
preparation. 
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Although some are much more risky than others almost any human endeavor 
carries some risk. Broadly speaking, people take different types of risk in making 
daily decisions. The risk occurs in people's decisions when there is the potential that 
a taken choice will lead to a loss (i.e., an undesirable outcome). Some authors 
(Schonberg, Fox, & Poldrack, 2010) suggested that people tend to see risk in terms 
of possible negative outcomes, rather than conceiving it in terms of chance 
probabilities. In keeping with this view, other works (Loewenstein et al., 2001; 
Schwarz, 2000; Slovic, 1987) showed that the risk's dimension encompasses a 
'strong fear' in having losses characterizing by lack of control. Based on these 
studies, decision maker's self-regulatory orientation plays a relevant role in 
explaining individual differences in taking risk. Indeed, it has been suggested that a 
specific self-regulatory competence influences the degree of risk-taking propensity 
(Steinberg, 2005). Since self-regulation can generally be defined as the ability to 
control, modify, and adapt one’s behavior considering people's emotions (Murtagh 
& Todd, 2004); a relevant role then is attributed to emotions in taking risky 
behaviors. Indeed, several authors (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, 
& Ritov, 1997; Mellers, 2000; Mellers & McGraw, 2001; Panno, Lauriola, & 
Figner, 2012; Weber & Johnson, 2009) showed that people often take risk based on 
anticipated emotions triggered during decision making processes. Anticipated 
emotions are typically expected to be experienced in the future as the outcome of 
choice done; for example, decision maker is assumed to anticipate how they will 
feel about obtaining different outcomes as the result of various counterfactual 
comparisons. “Anticipated emotions are emotions that are expected to occur when 
outcomes are experienced” (Loewenstein et al., 2001, p. 269). Several Decision 
Making theories of risk taking provide a prominent role for such emotions, which 
include the anticipated regret that might arise from prefactual comparisons before in 
making a decision (Bell, 1985; Loomes & Sugden, 1982, 1986; Mellers & McGraw, 
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2001; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997). Less attention has been paid to the 
relationship between decision maker's self-regulatory orientation and anticipated 
emotion, such as the anticipated regret, in making risky decisions. The major 
purpose of the present study was to examine how decision maker's regulatory mode 
affects anticipated regret experience before of taking risky choices.  
Regulatory modes in making decisions. 
A number of researchers pointed out many factors which might improve or 
impair the effectiveness of self-regulation strategies itself during goal pursuit (e.g., 
Carver & Scheier, 1998; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997; Kruglanski et al., 2000). 
Mischel and colleagues showed compelling differences among people's self-
regulatory strategies and emotional or cognitive sources for exerting self-regulation 
(Mischel, Cantor, & Feldman, 1996). Mischel's work attempted to shed light on 
these differences in terms of underlying mediating processes, such as self-regulatory 
strategies, emotions and goals. These authors also claimed that a challenge for 
future research consists of a better understanding how possible mediating individual 
or context variables interact and guide people's behavior (Mischel et al., 1996). In 
this framework, Kruglanski and colleagues have proposed regulatory mode theory, 
in which two independent goal-oriented motivational factors, like the so-called 
assessment and locomotion modes, are posited to influence people behavior, either 
as chronic personality dispositions or as momentarily as situationally induced states. 
More specifically, the assessment mode ‘‘constitutes the comparative aspect of self-
regulation concerned with critically evaluating entities or states, such as goals or 
means in relation to alternatives in order to judge relative quality’’ (Kruglanski et 
al., 2000, p. 794). By contrast, the locomotion mode ‘‘is the self-regulatory aspect 
concerned with movement from state to state and with committing the 
psychological resources that will initiate and maintain goal-directed progress in a 
straightforward manner, without undue distractions or delays” (Kruglanski et al., 
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2000, p. 794). In the assessment mode individuals emphasize critical evaluations 
(e.g., Which alternative is best?; What are my options?) rather than need in moving 
from state to state, such as in the locomotion mode (e.g., people's doing or in 
making something happen; see Higgins, Kruglanski, & Pierro, 2003, for more 
details). In other words, assessors are concerned with determining the rate, amount, 
size, or value of something, with critical evaluation to guide action. By contrast, 
locomotors are concerned with initiating and maintaining movement in strongly 
leading it to goal.  
Regulatory modes have been included among the most prominent individual 
difference variables, which may potentially account for choice behavior in decision 
making (Appelt, et al. 2011); but surprisingly, there are no empirical evidences of 
their relations with risk taking. People who are in locomotion mode are supposed to 
be dynamic and active decision-makers, while people who are in assessment mode 
are supposed to be concerned with the evaluative aspects of choice options, which 
may complicate decision making in terms of amount of information processed and 
may extend the deliberation time needed to get to the final decision (Kruglanski, et 
al. 2000). Camerer, Lowenstein, and Prelec (2005) have assimilated the distinction 
between assessment and locomotion orientation to the distinction between 
controlled and automatic processes. Consistent with this view, Mannetti and 
colleagues pointed out that if the locomotion mode overrides the assessment mode, 
more impulsive choices and decisions would be made. By contrast, if the 
assessment mode overrides the locomotion, less impulsive, systematic and more far-
sighted choices would result (Mannetti, Leder, Insalata, Pierro, Higgins, & 
Kruglanski, 2009). For example, locomotion is related to  willingness to take 
prompt decisions, to quickly initiate actions and then maintaining them without 
disruption. By contrast, assessment is related to taking time before making decisions 
in order to deeply investigate and appraise the alternatives (see Higgins et al., 2003; 
Kruglanski et al., 2000). 
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Avnet and Higgins (2003) demonstrated that a direct and causal link exists 
between regulatory modes and decision-making processes by inducing situationally 
assessment and locomotion modes and then assessing how these experimental 
conditions influenced people's purchasing behavior. In particular, the assessment 
mode was emphasized by asking research's participants to give examples from their 
personal lives, related to situations in which they behaved in an assessment-like way 
(e.g., Think of some occasion in which you thought about your positive and negative 
characteristics). Likewise, for locomotion, participants were asked to give 
examples related to situations in which they behaved in a locomotion-like way (e.g, 
Think of a time when you decided to do something and you could not wait to get 
started). Next, participants were presented with a real decision situation in which 
they had choose among different reading lights' brands. Furthermore, two decision 
strategies were combined with the experimental manipulation of regulatory modes 
in a 2 x 2 design. The “full comparison” strategy, which is meant to fit well with the 
assessment mode, required research participants to compare each option with all of 
the other options in the decision set along all attributes. By contrast, the 
“progressive elimination” strategy, which is presumed to fit well with the 
locomotion mode, was based on sequentially eliminating those options having the 
worst value on a given attribute (or attributes), until only one option remains. The 
results of the study showed that locomotors and assessors offered more money to 
purchase their preferred book-light when the decision strategy fitted with the 
induced mode; and more relevant, that assessment and locomotion modes can be 
reliably induced situationally. In the present study, Avnet and Higgins's (2003) 
manipulations to induce situationally regulatory modes were adopted. 
More recently, Pierro et al. (2008) provided empirical evidence that regulatory 
modes, both situationally induced or personality dispositions, affected the 
experience of post-decisional regret. The theoretical account for these findings is 
related to greater amount of counterfactual thinking, which in turn, is related to 
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more regret's experience. This latter is supposed to be stronger for people in 
assessment mode, based on their aptitude to make effortful and full comparisons in 
decision making, while people in locomotion mode are supposed to experience less 
post-decisional regret, based on their tendency to move suddenly from state to state, 
thereby leaving lesser room for counterfactual thinking (Pierro, Leder, Mannetti, 
Higgins, Kruglanski, & Aiello, 2008).  
A recent review (Molden, 2012) highlighted that regulatory modes affect basic 
process of judgment, including the evaluation of alternative hypotheses or 
counterfactuals, thus underpinning the relationship between regulatory modes and 
decision-making processes. As above showed, previous works (Avnet & Higgins, 
2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000; Molden, 2012; Pierro et al. 2008) related regulatory 
modes to processes underlying the people's decision making. Nevertheless, this 
literature considered consumer behavior and decision-making situations in which 
elements of risk were not directly involved. In addition, although post-decisional 
regret has been thought as a consequence of regulatory modes, less is known about 
anticipated regret as a mediator of the relation between regulatory modes and risky 
decision making. Hoch and Loewenstein (1991) pointed out that anticipated 
emotions related to desired and undesired future outcomes are crucial in making 
decisions; one may then consider anticipated emotions among the most prominent 
mediators of the self-regulation's effect on risk taking. Keeping in mind this, I 
believe that a relationship between regulatory modes and decision making not only 
may be detected in the context of risky decisions, but that anticipated regret also is a 
key element mediating this relation. On the one hand, these hypotheses are based on 
Pierro et al.'s (2008) study which showed that regulatory modes affected the 
experience of post-decisional regret. On the another hand, they are based on J/DM 
research's findings, which also showed how anticipation of negative emotional 
reactions, such as regret, affect risky choice (see Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 
1997, for more details). Thus, combining regulatory modes theory (i.e., Kruglanski 
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et al., 2000) with decision research (e.g., Mellers et al., 1997; Nordgren, van der 
Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2007; Richard, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996; Richard, de 
Vries, & van der Pligt, 1998), I endeavored to shed light on how anticipated regret 
stems from decision maker's self-regulatory orientation; and accordingly affects the 
risky decision making.  
Anticipated regret and risky choice 
Before presenting the specific goals of this study, let me now provide a more 
detailed description of anticipated regret. Regret's research (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 
2002; Zeelenberg, & Beattie, 1997; Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 
1996; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, van der Pligt, Manstead, 
van Empelen, & Reinderman, 1998; Zeelenberg, 1999) covers a wide range of life 
domains (e.g., mental health outcomes, risky decision making, interpersonal 
relationship and so forth); and it is one of the most common emotions studied 
(Shimanoff, 1984). Understanding the trajectory of regret—how regret forms and 
affects the behavior—is indeed crucial across different fields (i.e., psychology, 
economics, medicine, marketing, neuroscience and so forth). 
Anticipated regret can be defined as a cognitively based anticipated emotion that 
people trigger when figuring out that future outcomes would be better, if a different 
decision would be made. The idea is that this emotion is anticipated and taken into 
account when people are evaluating different options (Mellers et al., 1997; Mellers 
& MacGraw, 2001; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004; 
Zeelenberg, 1999). For example, before in making a decision, one can anticipate 
future regret whether he/she thinks that the decision go awry. The expected 
feedback on decision's potential outcome then triggers prefactual thinking 
protecting against the possibility of experiencing severe regret in missing the good 
decision. The rationale behind anticipated regret's works is that when future regret is 
brought to the attention of the decision maker (i.e., just before the decision is made), 
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this feeling will be receive a weight in the decisional process (Connolly & 
Zeelenberg, 2002; Zeelenberg, & Beattie, 1997; Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Pligt, 
& de Vries, 1996; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, van der Pligt, Manstead, van Empelen, & 
Reinderman, 1998; Zeelenberg, 1999). In other words, people consider the 
possibility of future regret before making their decisions (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 
2007; Zeelenberg, 1999). It is worth nothing, this idea not only applies to consumer 
or purchasing behavior, but also to risky decision making in which elements of 
uncertainty and potential for losses are supposed to make more salient one’s 
anticipated regret feelings (Mellers et al., 1997; Mellers & MacGraw, 2001;  
Zeelenberg, van Dijk, van der Pligt, Manstead, van Empelen, & Reinderman, 1998; 
Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004; Zeelenberg, 1999). 
Relevant to this study, Zeelenberg (1999) showed that anticipated regret can be 
induced by providing the decision makers with the possibility of being disclosed 
about the outcomes of both chosen and unchosen options, before making a choice. 
This aspect also characterizes real life situations, in which people often receive 
information about forgone outcomes. For example, people choosing to invest in a 
stock is also likely to learn about future stock prices for the chosen stock as well as 
also for the non-chosen stocks. Unlike post decisional regret situations, in which 
experience of regret is determined by counterfactual thinking after the decision is 
made, anticipated regret is triggered by the expected feedback, which is stimulated 
by the possibility of making prefactual thinking before the decision is made (see 
Zeelenberg, 1999, for more details). 
Classical regret studies showed that anticipated regret is related to decision 
making under risk (e.g., Bakker, Buunk, & Manstead, 1997; Conner, Sandberg, 
McMillan, & Higgins, 2006; Cooke, Sniehotta, & Schuz, 2007; Li, Zhou, Sun, Rao, 
Zheng, & Liang, 2010; Nordgren, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2007; Richard, 
van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996; Richard, de Vries, & van der Pligt, 1998; Sheeran & 
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Orbell, 1999; Tochkov, 2009; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 
2004; Zeelenberg, 1999; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997). It has been shown that 
anticipated regret leads to riskier choices in the lottery context (e.g., Sheeran & 
Orbell, 1999; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004) as well as in investment decisions and 
negotiations (e.g., Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997). A number of studies also 
demonstrated that anticipated regret increases a greater one’s perception of risk 
(e.g., Nordgren, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2007); and that, it is also strongly 
related to risk aversion in some risk domains, such as taking unprotected sexual 
behaviors (e.g., Richard, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996; Richard, de Vries, & van 
der Pligt, 1998), binge-drinking behaviors (e.g., Cooke, Sniehotta, & Schuz, 2007), 
gambling (e.g., Li, Zhou, Sun, Rao, Zheng, & Liang, 2010; Tochkov, 2009), 
adolescent smoking (e.g., Conner, Sandberg, McMillan, & Higgins, 2006). 
Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007) suggested that based on expected feedback (i.e., 
framed as positive or negative) the anticipated regret can promote both risk-
avoiding and risk-seeking tendencies. Importantly, two recent studies (Li, Zhou, 
Sun, Rao, Zheng, & Liang, 2010; Tochkov, 2009) addressed this issue, pointing out 
that the relationship between anticipated regret and risky choices may also switch 
from risk-avoiding to risk-seeking based on the features of the risk task which is 
presented to the decision maker.  
Relevant to my goals, it is worth noting that—during the past decade or so—
behavioral decision scientists moved from static lotteries and decision scenarios 
(e.g., Zeelenberg, 1999) to dynamic risk measures (e.g., Lejuez et al., 2002), which 
engender a naturalistic metaphor triggering a relatively strong affective response 
(i.e., a sense of escalating tension) that mimics in a controlled environment the 
affective phenomenological experience of risk taking typical of naturalistic 
environments (see Schonberg, Fox, & Poldrack, 2010, for more details). In addition, 
such modern dynamic risk tasks involve feedback-related emotional processes 
triggered by the processing of outcomes following from participants’ decisions. This 
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feature reinforced my decision to study the mediating role of anticipated regret by 
one of the most popular behavioral measures in this specific class of tasks - i.e., the 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART, Lejuez et al., 2002, explanations see below). 
To the best my knowledge—none of the reviewed studies have investigated the 
effect of regulatory modes and anticipated regret on risky choices in dynamic tasks, 
in which participants can receive (positive or negative) feedback about the 
outcomes of their decisions (i.e., win or loss). 
Present Research 
On the one hand, we know that regulatory modes affect post-decisional regret 
(Pierro et al., 2008). On the another hand, decision research's empirical evidence 
has strongly showed a relationship between anticipated regret and risk attitude (e.g., 
Li et al., 2010; Mellers et al., 1997; Nordgren, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 
2007; Richard, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996; Richard, de Vries, & van der Pligt, 
1998; Zeelenberg, 1999). Thus, relating the regulatory mode theory to J/DM 
research, I hypothesized that regulatory modes also affect anticipated regret 
experience, which in turn, affects risky behavior. More specifically, I hypothesized 
that decision maker's assessment orientation led to greater anticipated regret 
experience, which in turn, decreased the amount of risky choices taken in the 
BART. By contrast, decision maker's locomotion orientation led to lesser 
anticipated regret experience, which in turn, increased the amount of risky choices 
taken in the BART. 
I carried out a comprehensive series of three studies in order to investigate the 
expected relationships. In the first study, I tested the effect of situationally induced 
anticipated regret in making risky choices in BART. Once underpinned this 
relationship, I devised the second study to demonstrate a causal link between 
situationally induced regulatory modes and risk taking mediated by anticipated 
regret experience. Finally, in the third study, I replicated and extended the findings 
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of the earlier study by investigating the relationship between chronic regulatory 
modes—rather than situationally induce—and anticipated regret in making risky 
decisions.  
Study 1 
Consistent with the theoretical framework presented in the introduction, I 
designed this experiment to show that a causal relation exists between situationally 
induced anticipated regret and risky choices. As a reminder, a novel and distinctive 
feature of this study is the assessment of risk preferences in dynamic task, while 
other similar studies relied more on static gambles or scenarios (e.g., Camille et al., 
2004; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997). I expect that participants in the anticipated 
regret condition (see procedures) take less risky choices than participants in the 
control condition. Positive findings supporting this causal relation are also a 
prerequisite for testing the mediating role of anticipated regret between regulatory 
modes and risk taking (i.e., Studies 2 and 3). 
Methods 
Participants 
Seventy-seven undergraduate students at the University of Rome ‘‘Sapienza’’ 
participated in this study (Mage = 21, SD = 1.25; range 19 to 25 years; 70% 
females). 
Materials 
BART. The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejuez et al., 2002), hereafter referred 
to as BART (see Figure 1), is a computerized task modeling real-world risk 
behavior through the conceptual frame of balancing the potential for reward and 
harm (Leigh 1999; Lejuez et al. 2002). In the task, the participant is presented with 
30 trials in which they are asked to inflate a balloon by clicking a specific button on 
the screen. On each pump the balloon inflates and  $.05 is accrued in a temporary 
bank. However, balloons can explode anytime during the task, with an explosion 
probability of 1/128 on the first pump. The participant can decide whether 
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collecting the money in the temporary bank by transferring it to a permanent bank. 
If the balloon pops before the participant collects the money, all earnings for that 
balloon are lost, and the next balloon is presented. Thus, each pump confers greater 
risk, but also greater potential reward. It is worth noting that the participant was not 
informed about the expected balloon breakpoint. However, the average number of 
pumps across trials that would maximize one’s earnings should be equal to 64 
pumps, with lower and higher numbers describing risk-advantageous and risk-
disadvantageous strategies, respectively (Lejuez et al., 2002). A recent meta-
analysis showed that research participants, on average make 33 pumps per balloon, 
thereby showing a largely sub-optimal number of risky choices (Lauriola, Panno, 
Levin, & Lejuez, in press). 
The primary BART score is the average number of pumps on unexploded 
balloons, also referred to as average adjusted pumps, with higher scores indicating 
greater risky choices taken. A number of studies used the average adjusted pump as 
behavioral criteria. These studies, which compared experimental groups versus 
control groups, provided evidence that the average adjusted pumps was sensitive to 
a variety of experimental manipulations (e.g., sleep deprivation, medical therapies, 
or craving; Reynolds et al. 2006; Acheson et al. 2007; Acheson & de Wit 2008; 
White, Lejuez, de Wit 2007; Killgore, 2007; Killgore, Grugle, Killgore, Leavitt, 
Watlington, McNair, Balkin, 2008; Lighthall, Mather, Gorlick, 2009; Reed, Levin, 
Evans, 2010). Many studies also showed that the average adjusted pumps was 
associated with real-world risky behaviors occurring outside the laboratory, thereby 
legitimating the BART as a measure of risk attitude (Aklin, et al., 2005; Hunt et al., 
2005; Lejuez et al., 2002, 2003; Lejuez et al. 2007; Skeel, Neudecker, Pilarski & 
Pytlak, 2008; Bornovalova et al. 2009; Mishra, Lalumière & Williams, R. J. 2010; 
Swogger, Walsh, Lejuez, & Kosson, 2010; MacPherson, Reynolds, Daughters, 
Wang, Cassidy, Mayes, & Lejuez, 2010). In the present study, all research 
Predicting Risky Choices 
 
 27 
participants were informed that top 10 participants sorted in descending orders by 
their total earnings on BART were rewarded by a prepaid mobile phone cards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Procedure and manipulation 
The experimental manipulation of anticipated regret was in keeping with 
previous studies, in which anticipated regret was induced by providing research 
participants with information that they will receive feedback about the outcomes of 
both chosen and unchosen options (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; Zeelenberg, & 
Beattie, 1997; Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996; Zeelenberg, van 
Dijk, van der Pligt, Manstead, van Empelen, & Reinderman, 1998; Zeelenberg, 
1999; Camille et al., 2004). For instance, Camille et al. (2004) induced anticipated 
regret in a two-outcome risky decision task depending on whether participants were 
given the opportunity to compare the outcome of the chosen option with the 
outcome of the rejected option. As a reminder, in the BART balloons can explode 
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anytime during the task, with an explosion probability of 1/128 on the first pump. 
The participant can then decide whether transferring the money from temporary 
bank to the permanent bank or to inflate the balloon presented. If the balloon pops 
before the participant collects the money, all earnings for that balloon are lost, and 
the next balloon is presented. Research participants in the anticipated regret 
condition (N = 39) were informed – before taking the task – that they will be 
disclosed at the end the task about their actual total earnings as well as about the 
potential earnings attainable in balancing to best pumping with collecting money. 
By contrast, research participants in the control condition (N = 38) were only 
informed about the actual total earnings resulting from their choices and no 
reference to the potential earnings was made. Importantly, – before taking the task – 
participants in both groups were asked: “How much regret would you feel, if you 
will miss the game's prize?”. Regret ratings were collected on a seven point rating 
scale where 1 = “No regret at all” and 7 = “Full of regret”. 
Results 
Manipulation check. Results of a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
performed on participants’ anticipated regret ratings yielded a significant effect of 
experimental condition—in comparison to control condition: F(1,75) = 7,90 p < 
.001, d = .64. Participants reported lower anticipated regret in the control condition 
(M = 2.03, SD = 1.19) than in the experimental condition (M = 2.90, SD = 1.50). 
This result indicates that successfully anticipated regret was induced (see Figure 2). 
Risky choice. A one way ANOVA was performed to test the effect of situationally 
induced anticipated regret on risky choices (see Figure 2). As predicted, there were 
lesser risky choices in the situationally induced anticipated regret condition (M = 
27.57, SD = 11.98) than in the control condition (M = 33.90, SD = 14.76), F(1, 75) = 
4.27, p < .05, d = .47.  
Results of Study 1 provided support to the claim that situationally induced 
anticipated regret affected one’s choices in decision making under risk. Noteworthy, 
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this effect was detected in a dynamic behavioral measure of risk triggering 
emotional processes by providing immediate feedback to the decision maker. 
Figure 2. Manipulation-check scores for anticipated regret and control groups. Risk 
taking (average adjusted pumps) as a function of anticipated regret and control 
groups. 
 
Study 2 
The goal of present study consists of showing that anticipated regret mediated 
the relation between situationally induced regulatory modes (i.e., assessment and 
locomotion) and risky behavior. I expected that assessors increased anticipated 
regret feelings, which in turn, reduced people's risky choices. By contrast, I 
expected that locomotors decreased anticipated regret feelings, which in turn, 
increased people's risky choices. 
Methods 
Participants 
One hundred and ten undergraduate students participated in the study (Mage = 
25,37 SD = 3.95; range 23 to 45 years; 75% females).  
Procedure and manipulation 
All research participants took the BART according to the procedures described 
in Study 1 for the control condition. Participants were randomly assigned to either 
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an assessment (N = 56) or a locomotion (N = 54) condition. To induce participants' 
locomotion and assessment orientations I asked them to think of three different 
situations in which they personally exemplified either high locomotion or high 
assessment behaviors and to write them down (see also Appendix B). For 
locomotion, they were asked to: ‘‘Think of a day when you made many different 
things’’; ‘‘Think of a time when you finished one project and did not wait long 
before you started a new one’’; ‘‘Think of a time when you decided to do something 
and you could not wait to get started’’. For assessment, they were asked to: ‘‘Think 
of some occasion in which you compared yourself with other people’’; “Think of 
some occasion in which you thought about your positive and negative 
characteristics’’; ‘‘Think of some occasion in which you critiqued work done by 
others or yourself’’. These were taken from items in the locomotion and assessment 
scales of the regulatory mode questionnaire (see Kruglanski et al., 2000, for more 
details). This experimental manipulation has been shown to be effective by Avnet 
and Higgins (2003). Afterwards locomotion and assessment manipulations 
participants were asked to rate their anticipated regret as in Study 1.  
Results 
Risky choice. I tested my hypothesis that people's anticipated regret experience 
mediated the effect of situationally induced regulatory modes on risky behavior. 
According to the multistep procedure recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986), 
for mediation to occur, four conditions need to be met. First, variation in the 
independent variable (i.e., regulatory modes) should significantly account for 
variation in the mediator (i.e. anticipated regret). Second, variation in the mediator 
should significantly account for variation in the dependent variable (i.e. risky 
choices in the BART). Third, variation in the independent variable should 
significantly account for variation in the dependent variable. Fourth, the effect of 
the independent on the dependent variable should be substantially reduced once the 
mediator effect on the dependent variable is controlled for.  
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Results of multiple regression analyses (see Figure 3) showed that, consistent 
with my hypotheses, decision maker's regulatory mode (locomotion vs. assessment 
orientation) affected risk taking on BART (β = .23, p < .05). More specifically, 
assessors — in comparison to locomotors — exhibited a lesser number of risky 
choices. Hence, the first condition of the Baron and Kenny's (1986) procedure was 
satisfied. Furthermore, I found that situationally induced regulatory modes also 
affected the participants' anticipated regret experience (β = - .21, p < .05). In 
particular, assessors — in comparison to locomotors — experienced more 
anticipated regret. This finding satisfied the second condition of Baron and Kenny’s 
(1986) procedure. Moreover, lower score of participants' anticipated regret 
significantly predicted a greater risk taking on the BART (β = - .26, p < .01), thus 
satisfying the third condition. Finally, results showed that, once the mediator effect 
on the dependent variable was controlled for, the effect of regulatory modes on 
risky choice became non-significant (β = .17, p = .07), thereby satisfying the fourth 
condition of Baron and Kenny’ procedure, too.  
As to this latter finding, I employed Preacher and Hayes's (2004) procedure to 
extrapolate estimates of indirect effects. Preacher and Hayes’s strategy employs the 
use of bootstrapping, a non-parametric re-sampling procedure, to estimate the size 
of indirect effects using adjusted percentile (asymmetrical) confidence intervals. 
Ninety-five percent confidence intervals (C.I.) were employed and 5000 
bootstrapping re-samples were run. Results showed that the bias corrected 
confidence intervals obtained not contained zero (C.I. = 0.17 to 3.79); showing that 
the participants' anticipated regret experience fully mediated the effect of 
situationally induced regulatory modes on risky behavior. In other words, these 
findings showed that situationally induced regulatory mode (i.e., assessors vs. 
locomotors) affected the participants' anticipated regret experience, which in turn, 
affected individual difference in taking risk (see Figure 3).  
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Figure 3. Path model depicting relations among manipulated regulatory mode 
condition (dummy coded: assessment = 0, locomotion = 1), anticipated regret, and 
BART score. Numbers represent regression equation β coefficients. *p < .05. **p < 
.01. 
 
Study 3 
The goal of present study consists of showing that people's anticipated regret 
mediated the relation between predominant chronic regulatory mode (i.e., 
assessment vs. locomotion orientation) and risky behavior. I expected that chronic 
assessment orientation increased the anticipated regret's feelings, which in turn, 
decreased people's risky choices. By contrast, chronic locomotion orientation 
decreased anticipated regret's feelings, which in turn, increased people's risky 
choices. Importantly, in this study I assessed chronic regulatory modes one month 
before the experiment (see explanations below). 
Methods 
Participants 
One hundred and eleven undergraduate students participated in the study (Mage 
= 21,28 SD = 3.52; range 19 to 44 years; 68% females).  
Assessment vs. 
Locomotion 
Anticipated Regret 
BART Score 
.23* 
- .21* 
- .26** 
(.17) 
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Measures 
Regulatory Mode Questionnaire.  
Kruglanski et al. (2000) developed two separate scales which assessed chronic 
individual differences in assessment and locomotion. Empirical evidence showed 
the independence between these people's self-regulatory tendencies (Kruglanski et 
al., 2000). Accordingly, they found the unidimensionality, internal consistency, and 
temporal stability of locomotion and assessment conceived as two independent 
psychometric scale through a comprehensive series of studies (see Kruglanski et al., 
2000, for more details). These researchers highlighted that locomotion and 
assessment orientations are essentially uncorrelated with each other, that each 
contributes to self-regulatory success, and that each relates to a distinct task 
orientation and motivational emphasis (Kruglanski et al., 2000; Higgins, 
Kruglanski, & Pierro, 2003). I measured participants’ chronic regulatory mode with 
the Regulatory Mode Questionnaire (RMQ; Kruglanski et al., 2000), which consists 
of 24 items using six-point scales (see also Appendix A). Sample items include “I 
often compare myself with other people” (i.e., assessment mode) and “When I finish 
one project, I often wait awhile before getting started on a new one” (i.e., 
locomotion mode, reverse scored). There is literature showing that assessment and 
locomotion orientations are uncorrelated (see Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 
2000). This was also the case in the current sample: r = -.14, p > .10. In this study, I 
calculated participants' predominant chronic regulatory mode; for this purpose, I 
subtracted the assessment score (M = 45.29, SD = 8.30, Cronbach’s α = .78) from 
the locomotion score (M = 50.46, SD = 7.26, Cronbach’s α = .72). Analyses are 
based on this difference score (M = 5.17, SD = 11.76), for which a higher score 
indicated a greater relative chronic use of locomotion mode. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested on two separate occasions, four weeks apart, which were 
framed as two unrelated studies. I chose this procedure to more conservatively test 
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the predictive power of the regulatory mode variables. On the first session, 
participants filled in self-report battery, which included the Regulatory Mode 
Questionnaire (RMQ; Kruglanski et al, 2000). The questionnaires were 
administered in small-group sessions of about eight people. Four weeks later, on the 
second session, participants played the BART according to the procedure used in 
Study 2. Again, anticipated regret feeling was assessed as in Study 1 and 2. 
Results 
Risky choice. I tested my hypothesis that people's anticipated regret experience 
mediated the effect of chronic regulatory modes to risky choice. I carried out 
analyses according to the multistep procedure recommended by Baron and Kenny 
(1986), as described above (see study 2, for more details). Consistent with my 
hypothesis, the chronic regulatory mode (assessment vs. locomotion orientation) 
affected risky choices (β = .21, p < .05). More specifically, predominant chronic 
assessment decreased the number of risky choices. By contrast, predominant 
chronic locomotion increased risk taking on BART. Furthermore, I found that 
chronic regulatory modes affected participants' anticipated regret experience (β = - 
.33, p < .001). In particular, predominant chronic assessment increased the 
anticipated regret feelings. By contrast, predominant chronic locomotion decreased 
the anticipated regret feelings. Furthermore, lower score of participants' anticipated 
regret significantly predicted a greater number of risky choices in the BART (β = - 
.25, p < .001); thus, satisfying the third condition. Finally, once the mediator effect 
on the dependent variable was controlled for, the effect of chronic regulatory modes 
on risky choice became non-significant (β = .15, p > .10). 
Again, the Preacher and Hayes's (2004) procedure showed that the bias corrected 
confidence intervals obtained not contained zero (C.I. = .01 to .21); showing then, 
that the participants' anticipated regret experience fully mediated the effect of the 
chronic regulatory modes on risky behavior. In other words, these findings 
expanded Study 2's previous results, showing that chronic regulatory mode also 
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affected the people's anticipated regret experience, which in turn, affected individual 
difference in taking risky choices (see Figure 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Path model depicting relations among predominant chronic regulatory 
mode (it was yielded subtracting the assessment score from the locomotion score), 
anticipated regret, and BART score. Numbers represent regression equation β 
coefficients. *p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
General Discussion 
The results of three independent studies provided evidence that assessment and 
locomotion regulatory modes, both as chronic individual dispositions and as 
situationally induced states, influenced the amount of people’s experienced regret as 
well as their risky behaviors. These findings contribute to our understanding of 
regulatory mode, regret's experience and human decisions under risk (e.g., Pierro et 
al. 2008; Mellers & McGraw, 2001). Let me begin with anticipated regret's 
experience. The idea behind the present work was that people faced with risky 
situations may engage in an anticipatory simulation of feelings, such as regret that 
these situations would engender. Indeed, the present findings shed light on the link 
between the people's anticipated regret experience and risky choices. Although this 
association is not novel, as there is some evidence for this relation in static gambles, 
lotteries or self-reported measures (e.g., Bakker et al., 1997; Conner et al., 2006; 
Cooke et al., 2007; Li et al., 2010; Nordgren, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2007; 
Predominant locomotion 
mode 
Anticipated Regret 
BART  
Score 
.21* 
- .33** 
- .25** 
( .15) 
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Richard, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996; Richard, de Vries, & van der Pligt, 1998; 
Sheeran & Orbell, 1999; Tochkov, 2009; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007; Zeelenberg & 
Pieters, 2004; Zeelenberg, 1999; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997); there is no empirical 
evidence in the literature that regret feeling have an influence on risk attitude in 
dynamic risk tasks, such as BART. Differently from previous literature, I chose the 
BART as it triggers a relatively strong affective response (i.e., a sense of escalating 
tension) that mimics the affective phenomenological experience of risk taking. It is 
worth nothing that this BART's feature bridges the gap between lab's setting and 
real-world risky choices (see Schonberg, Fox, & Poldrack, 2010, for more details). 
Thus, the choice to adopt the BART also underpins the ecological validity of the 
present work. Moreover, it also permits us to extend previous findings which show 
a link between anticipated regret and risk perception (e.g., Nordgren et al., 2007) to 
real risky behavior.  
Relating the BART's properties (i.e., Schonberg, Fox, & Poldrack, 2010) to 
regret's works (e.g., Camille, 2004; Zeelenberg, 1999) it is not difficult to imagine 
how the decision's feedback occurring in the BART is crucial to engage prefactual 
thinking triggering anticipated regret. To the best my knowledge — the present 
research is the first attempt to underpin the relationship between anticipated regret 
(i.e., an emotion triggered when participants expect a feedback about the 'good or 
bad' outcomes that result from their decisions) and risky choices occurring in 
making repeated decisions which involve immediate outcome feedback. Based on 
these premises, let me now show how these findings relate to risk taking literature. 
Previous studies have shown that anticipated regret increases risk's perception (i.e., 
Nordgren et al., 2007), and also increases healthy self-reported behaviors (i.e., 
Richards et al., 1996, 1998). The Study 1's findings point out that situationally 
induced anticipated regret (vs. controls) affects risky behavior decreasing the 
number of risky choices taken in a task triggering decision making emotional-based 
processes (i.e., when occurring post-decisional feedback-based emotions). The 
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present work (i.e., Study 1) then extends previous findings (i.e., Nordgren et al., 
2007; Richards et al., 1996, 1998) as it shows that situations which trigger the 
people's anticipated regret experience decreases the number of risky choices 
occurring when the sense of escalating tension related to risk escalates based on 
expected result of the decision. 
Once underpinned the relationship between anticipated regret and risky choices 
in BART (see Study 1); I then move on how anticipated regret stems from decision 
maker's self-regulatory orientation (i.e., assessment and locomotion modes), and in 
turn, affects risky behaviors (see Studies 2, 3). Although regulatory modes have 
been related to decision making as well as to post-decisional regret in consumer 
behavior. No study so far tested the hypothesis that regulatory modes can influence 
risk taking by increasing or decreasing regret feelings.  
First, let me point out the link between regulatory modes and risky choices. 
Indeed, in the—to the best of my knowledge—there is no evidence that regulatory 
modes affect risky choices, nor there is evidence on mechanisms underlying the 
relationship between decision maker's regulatory mode and making risky decisions. 
Taken together the present findings increase our understanding on these 
relationships. Broadly speaking, people's regulatory modes as chronic individual 
predispositions and as situationally induced states affect risky choices in making 
decision. More specifically, based on study 2's findings I demonstrated that 
situationally induced assessment—in comparison to situationally induced 
locomotion—mode decreases the number of risky choices taken in BART. It is 
worth noting that based on study 3's findings, individuals' chronic regulatory mode 
predicted risky choices; thus, expanding on study 2's findings (i.e., where it is 
showed how situationally induced regulatory modes affect people's risky choices). 
In Study 3 individuals' chronic regulatory mode were assessed one month before the 
experiment, thereby showing a long term stable effect of individual differences on 
risky decision making.  
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Getting into mechanisms relating decision maker's self-regulatory orientations to 
risky behavior, I think that an important role is assumed by anticipated emotions, 
such as regret (Mellers et al, 1997), which decision maker triggers before taking a 
risky decision. The present work then focus on regret emotion to highlight also 
mechanisms underlying the relationship between regulatory modes and risky 
choices. Indeed, describing the regret's trajectory in making risky choices, I also 
find that the anticipated regret mediates the relationship between decision maker's 
regulatory mode and risky behavior. More specifically, these findings show that 
people's assessment mode produces greater anticipated regret's experience, which in 
turn, decreases their risky choices during decisional processes. By contrast, people's 
locomotion mode produces lesser anticipated regret's experience, which in turn, 
increases their risky choices in making decisions.  
Previous studies (Avnet & Higgins, 2003; Kruglanski et al, 2000; Molden, 2012; 
Pierro et al., 2008) showed that regulatory modes affect individual differences in 
making decision. Relevant to the present study, Pierro et al. (2008) focused on post-
decisional regret showing that regulatory modes affect experienced regret after 
buying the laptop. Based on present work's results, I extend Pierro et al.'s (2008) 
findings in two ways: First, I show that people's regulatory modes affect regret's 
experience still before making a decision (i.e., decision maker's regulatory mode 
affects anticipated regret as well as post-decisional regret). Second, I show that 
regulatory modes not only affect consumer decision making (e.g., laptop's purchase 
as showed in Pierro et al., 2008), but they also affect risky choices occurring in 
making decisions. Based on previous studies (Avent & Higgins, 2003; Kruglansky 
et al., 2000; Pierro et al. 2008) which showed how regulatory modes are related to 
different strategies in making a decision. Thus, the findings of present study show 
that people with assessment concerns are strategically motivated to trigger 
anticipated regret because it permits making comparisons. By contrast, people with 
locomotion concerns are strategically motivated not to trigger anticipated regret 
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because it interferes with smooth and uniform movement to the next state. In this 
view, a major result of the present study consists of underpinning the relationship 
between people's regulatory modes and making decisions, showing how decision 
maker's self-regulatory orientation also affects risky choices occurring during 
decisional processes. These findings have also several implications for decision 
making research on individual differences (Appelt et al., 2011; Lauriola et al., in 
press). To begin with, the study 2 identifies a situational variable which influences 
the anticipated regret's amount triggered before of taking a risky decision. But it 
does more than this. As study 3, after all, shows the same effect assessing 
individuals' chronic assessment and locomotion orientation one month before the 
experiment. Thus supporting the ecological validity of the effects of regulatory 
modes on risk taking as well as experimentally induced temporary differences in 
regulatory modes orientation. Taken together these findings could help to explain 
why the literature yielded unstable and stable results investigating individual 
differences in taking risky choice (see Appelt et al., 2011, for more details). Indeed, 
based on these findings, the situationally induced assessment and locomotion could 
create the instability. By contrast, the chronic individual differences in assessment 
and locomotion could provide the stability.  
These findings could also have important applied implications since it is not 
difficult to imagine how one of the regulatory orientations could be made more 
accessible in daily life by situational cues and/or training instructions. For instance, 
situationally induced assessment orientation triggering people's anticipated regret 
may increase safer choices in making decisions. Moreover, the assessment motive 
for triggering anticipated regret is of particular interest. In some ways, it relates to 
self-improvement (Kruglanski et al., 2000). Since, “it is about how to make the 
decision-making process itself better. It involves critical reflection on both what was 
good and what was bad about the process — the essence of evaluative criticism” 
(Pierro et al., 2008, p. 327). Future studies might then shed light on how this 
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particular ‘critical reflection' affects anticipated emotions in making decisions under 
risk. Further studies are also needed in order to explore more fully whether and how 
the impact of regulatory mode on risky choices could itself be affected by other 
personal and situational variables. For instance, future works might then shed light 
on how personality individual differences may mediate or moderate the relationship 
between decision maker's regulatory mode and risky decisions. Although it was 
beyond the scope of the current study to investigate how personality dispositions 
(e.g., extraversion and neuroticism) may mediate the regulatory modes' effect on 
risky choices. Nevertheless, let me here consider some possible additional factors of 
interest — extroversion, neuroticism individual differences and fast versus accurate 
information processing. First, based on previous studies (e.g., Lauriola & Levin, 
2001) we know that higher individuals' extroversion predict riskier choices. On the 
regulatory modes' side, we know that locomotion correlated positively with 
extroversion (see Kruglanski et al., 2000, for more details). Thus, extraversion may 
also mediate the relationship between locomotion orientation and risky behavior. 
Second, Lauriola and Levin (2001) found a tendency for neuroticism disposition to 
have the opposite effect on risk taking for loss and gain domains. They showed that 
higher neuroticism's scores were associated with lesser risk taking in gain domain. 
By contrast, higher neuroticism's score were also associated with greater risk taking 
in loss domain. Moreover, Kruglanski and colleagues (2000) have also shown that 
people's assessment orientation is related to neuroticism disposition. Interestingly, 
based on these findings (i.e., Lauriola & Levin, 2001; Kruglanski et al., 2000) we 
may then expect that risk domain (i.e., gain and loss) may moderate the relationship 
between decision maker's assessment orientation and risky behavior. Third, a recent 
review (i.e., Molden 2012) has shown a link between regulatory modes and the 
prioritization of fast versus accurate information processing in making judgments. 
Accordingly, it is easy to imagine how the prioritization of fast versus accurate 
information processing may affect risky choices occurring in decision-making 
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processes (see Weber & Johnson, 2009, for more details). The information 
processing may then moderate the relationship between regulatory modes and risky 
behavior. For instance, people's assessment orientation could pay greater attention 
in processing gain, loss and probability of loss values occurring in making risky 
decisions. By contrast, people's locomotion orientation may pay lesser attention to 
these information (i.e., gain, loss, probability of loss) in making risky decisions. 
Future studies may then shed light on these mechanisms investigating regulatory 
modes' effect on risky behaviors by adopting a task assessing individuals' gain, loss 
and probability sensitivity in making decisions (e.g., Columbia Card Task, CCT; see 
Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009, for more details). It is worth noting, 
devising investigations which relate decision maker's regulatory mode to emotions 
and decision making promise novel insights in our understanding of the human risk 
behaviors.
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CHAPTER 3 
Emotion regulation and risk taking: Predicting risky choice in deliberative 
decision making 
Only very recently has research demonstrated that experimentally induced 
emotion regulation strategies (i.e., cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression) 
affect risky choice (e.g., Heilman et al., 2010). However, it is unknown whether this 
effect also operates via habitual use of emotion regulation strategies in risky choice 
involving deliberative decision making. I investigated the role of habitual use of 
emotion regulation strategies in risky choice using the "cold" deliberative version of 
the Columbia Card Task (CCT; Figner et al. 2009). Fifty-three participants 
completed the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003) and 
— one month later — the CCT and the PANAS. Greater habitual cognitive 
reappraisal use was related to increased risk taking. Greater habitual expressive 
suppression use was related to decreased risk taking. The results show that habitual 
use of reappraisal and suppression strategies predict risk taking when decisions 
involve predominantly cognitive-deliberative processes. 
 
This chapter is based on Panno, A., Lauriola, M., & Figner, B. (In press). 
Emotion regulation and risk taking: Predicting risky choice in deliberative decision 
making. Cognition & Emotion. DOI: 10.1080/02699931.2012.707642 
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During the previous decade, a trend emerged in decision research highlighting 
the influence of emotion on decision making (e.g., Lauriola & Levin, 2001; 
Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Weber & Johnson, 2009). One 
important line of such research has shown that decision makers often are influenced 
by anticipated emotions, which are generated by considering the potential choice 
outcomes (e.g., Mellers & McGraw, 2001). As a reminder: “Anticipated emotions 
are a component of the expected consequences of the decision. They are 'cognitive' 
emotions that are expected to occur when outcomes are experienced” (Loewenstein 
et al., 2001, p. 269). For instance, people who overestimate positive emotions 
related to favorable outcomes would tend to be overly risk seeking. By contrast, 
people who overestimate negative emotions related to unfavorable outcomes would 
tend to be overly risk averse (Mellers & McGraw, 2001).  
From a different line of research, pioneered by Gross and colleagues (Gross & 
John, 2003), we know that people feeling an emotion often use specific emotion 
regulation strategies (ER) to downregulate emotions in a wide range of life domains 
(e.g., interpersonal relationships, problem solving, etc.). Gross and John's (2003) 
two-factor model provides an emotion regulation theory: The model distinguishes 
between antecedent-focused strategies versus response-focused strategies. 
Antecedent-focused strategies are based on cognitive reappraisal, which represents 
one’s ability to reframe a situation in order to change its emotional impact (Gross, 
2002). For instance, before making a risky decision, decision makers can change the 
way they view the potential outcomes of their choice in order to minimize or 
modify their emotional impact on decision making. In contrast, response-focused 
strategies (i.e., expressive suppression) are based on the ability to inhibit the current 
emotion-expressive behaviors (Gross, 2002). For instance, decision makers may 
maintain a "poker-face" while bluffing during a card game in order to inhibit their 
emotions. Gross and John (2003) suggested that these two types of ER strategies are 
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independent of each other and that they can be differentially employed by 
individuals, either habitually (i.e., in the form of a personality disposition) or 
momentarily (e.g., situationally induced). 
Most recently, the two research lines, on emotions in decision making and on ER 
strategies, have converged in the investigation of whether decision makers use 
strategies of emotion regulation during decision making and whether differences in 
emotion regulation might explain differences in decision making. More generally, 
Westen and Blagov (2007) have argued that every decision can be viewed also as an 
act of emotion regulation, because the goal of any decision can be to minimize one’s 
future negative affective states and/or to maximize one's future positive affective 
states. According to this view, it thus is possible that reappraisal and/or suppression 
may indeed substantially affect individuals' choices. More specifically, research has 
started to investigate the role of emotion regulation (not always constrained to both 
cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression) in decision making: Several 
recent neuroscience studies (Martin & Delgado, 2011; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; 
Sokol-Hessner, Camerer, & Phelps 2012) investigated the role of cognitive 
reappraisal during financial decision making, its effect on loss aversion, and its 
neural correlates. To summarize briefly, these studies showed that cognitive 
reappraisal can affect risk-taking levels (Martin & Delgado, 2011), loss aversion, 
(Sokol-Hessner, Camerer, & Phelps 2012), and the arousal related to losses (Sokol-
Hessner et al., 2009). In addition, two behavioral studies focused on the same two 
ER strategies that I did: Miu and Crisan (2011) have shown that situationally 
induced reappraisal — in comparison to suppression — reduced the susceptibility to 
framing effects in risky choice. Most relevant to current study, Heilman, Cri an, 
Houser, Miclea, and Miu (2010) have shown that experimentally induced ER 
strategies influenced performance on a risky choice task, the Balloon Analogue Risk 
Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002): Participants in the suppression condition took 
significantly less risk than participants in the reappraisal condition. Noteworthy, in 
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Heilman and colleagues' study, participants were randomly assigned to either a 
reappraisal, suppression, or control condition, receiving instructions how to regulate 
their emotions (in the control condition, no ER instructions were given). After these 
ER instructions, participants watched one of two video clips, chosen to elicit 
specific incidental emotions, fear or disgust. After the clips, participants played the 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejuez et al., 2002) to assess risk-taking levels. In this 
paradigm, the ER strategy manipulation was introduced to test the effect of ER 
strategies on risk taking when participants had to regulate incidental emotions 
(elicited via video clip before the risk task). It is unknown whether habitual use of 
ER strategies used to regulate anticipated emotions the risky decisions would 
equally affect risk-taking levels. 
To summarize, previous research has shown not only that emotions themselves 
can affect risky choices, but that situationally induced ER strategies can also affect 
decision making. In contrast to the role of situationally induced ER strategies, in the 
current paper I was interested whether naturally occurring individual differences in 
the ER strategies people habitually adopt may affect their risky choices. A further 
goal of the current study was to extend the existing research with respect to the type 
of emotions likely to be involved, namely whether emotion regulation has an effect 
on risky decision making when anticipated emotions are involved.  
Consistent with the latter goal, I chose a task that delays feedback about the 
outcomes of participants' decisions until all decisions have been made. Thus, on 
logical grounds, if we still observe effects of emotion regulation on risky choices, it 
is plausible that ER strategies operated via anticipated emotions.  
In particular, I had two main hypotheses, based on prior research (regarding 
emotion regulation: Gross & John, 2003; Heilman et al., 2010; regarding decision 
making in the cold CCT: Figner et al., 2009; Figner & Weber, 2011): First, I 
predicted that individuals with a stronger tendency for habitual use of cognitive 
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reappraisal would show increased risk taking compared to individuals with a lower 
such tendency. Second, I predicted that individuals with a stronger tendency for 
habitual use of expressive suppression would show decreased risk taking compared 
to individuals with a lower such tendency. I expected that reappraisors would make 
relatively riskier choices because they are more likely to focus on positive emotions 
triggered by potential gains. By contrast, I expected that suppressors would make 
relatively less risky choices because they are more likely to focus on avoiding 
negative emotions triggered by negative potential outcomes (see chapter 4). 
 
METHODS 
Participants 
Fifty-three undergraduate students at the University of Rome “Sapienza” 
participated in the study (Mage = 21.73, SD = 4.05; range 19 to 44 years; 66% 
females). As reimbursement, participants received course credit plus a variable 
payment in the form of a prepaid mobile phone card whose amount was determined 
by the outcome of one of the CCT game rounds (with 1 point = 1 cent), randomly 
selected at the end of the task. 
Measures 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire. The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 
(ERQ: Gross & John, 2003) is a 10-item self-report scale assessing two individual 
strategies that people adopt in order to regulate their emotions: cognitive reappraisal 
and expressive suppression. Respondents rate the extent to which they agree with 
self-descriptive statements reflecting cognitive reappraisal (e.g., ‘‘When I want to 
feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the situation’’) or 
expressive suppression (e.g., ‘‘When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not 
to express them’’). Ratings are made on a 7-point Likert type scale with the response 
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anchored at the ends with 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly agree). The ERQ 
produces an overall score of "reappraisal" and an overall score of "suppression," 
quantifying the two independent ER strategies for each participant. Previous studies 
(Gross, 2002; Gross & John, 2003; John & Gross, 2004) found associations between 
cognitive reappraisal and positive mood and between expressive suppression and 
negative mood. Somewhat less strong effects were also found for the negative 
association between cognitive reappraisal and negative affect and the positive 
association between expressive suppression and negative affect (e.g., depression). 
These same studies also showed that ER strategies predict psychological well-being 
outcomes (e.g., life satisfaction, positive interpersonal relationships, personal 
growth, and environmental mastery). In the present study, I used the Italian ERQ 
version (Balzarotti, John, & Gross, 2010, see also Appendix A). The psychometric 
properties of the Italian ERQ version have been found to be reasonable with alpha 
reliabilities averaging .84 for reappraisal and .72 for suppression (Balzarotti, John, 
& Gross, 2010). Consistent with these findings, the internal consistencies in this 
sample were .81 for reappraisal and .74 for suppression. 
PANAS.   Because previous studies (Gross & John, 2003; John & Gross, 2004) 
have shown strong associations between ER strategies and mood, I assessed 
participants' mood states in order to be able to control for potentially confounding 
effects. Positive and negative mood states were operationalized by summing the 10 
positive and 10 negative affect items in the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule, 
respectively (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Participants were 
instructed to rate how they felt “right now” on a scale from 1 (= very slightly or not 
at all) to 5 (= extremely). Watson and colleagues reported alpha coefficients of .88 
and .87 for positive and negative mood, respectively. I observed alpha coefficients 
of .79 for positive mood and .86 for negative mood. 
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Columbia Card Task (CCT).   The "cold" CCT (Figner et al., 2009;  Figner & 
Weber, 2011; Gladwin, Figner, Crone, & Wiers, 2011) was developed to assess risk 
taking under predominantly deliberative conditions, i.e., when decisions are made 
with the involvement of mainly "cold" cognitive processes. Several experiments 
using self-reports, skin conductance measurement, and convergent validity with 
other measures (Figner et al., 2009) established that the cold version involves 
mainly deliberative cognitive processes and triggers comparatively little emotional 
arousal. This contrasts with the "hot" affective version of the CCT (see also chapter 
4) which was specifically designed to trigger substantial involvement of affective 
decision-making processes (the hot CCT achieves this by incorporating both 
immediate feedback about participants' choices and incremental stepwise risky 
decisions instead of the "overall" type of decisions in the cold CCT; details see 
below). For example, in the cold CCT participants report to more strongly rely on 
"mathematical decision strategies" compared to the hot CCT, while in the hot CCT, 
they report to rely more on their "gut feelings" and to experience greater emotional 
arousal when making their decisions, compared to the cold CCT (Figner et al., 
2009; Figner & Weber, 2011). 
In the current study, I used a shortened version that consisted of 24 game rounds 
(described in Figner & Weber, 2011; compared to the longer version consisting of 
54 game rounds described in Figner et al., 2009). Thus, participants played a total of 
24 game rounds. In each game round, 32 cards are presented face-down and the 
participant indicates how many cards he/she wants to turn over in the current round 
(see Figure 1). Participants indicate their choice by clicking on one of 33 buttons 
(ranging from 0 to 32 cards to be turned over). The main variable of interest is how 
many cards participants choose to turn over in each of the 24 game rounds. For each 
gain card that they turn over, they win the number of points the gain cards are worth 
in the current game round. However, if they encounter a loss card, the current game 
round is over (i.e., no more cards are turned over in that game round) and the loss 
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amount is subtracted from the points they had accrued in the current game round. 
Each new game round starts with a score of 0 points. Based on the main dependent 
variable (the number of cards chosen in each of the 24 game rounds) I derived my 
constructs of interest: The risk-taking level is the average number of cards chosen 
per game round. 
 
Figure 1 – Cold Version of Columbia Card Task, CCT. Adapted from Figner et al., 
(2009). 
 
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested on two separate occasions, four weeks apart, which were 
framed as two unrelated studies. I chose this procedure to more conservatively test 
the predictive power of the emotion regulation variables: In the first session, 
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participants filled out a self-report battery, which included the Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire (ERQ; Balzarotti, John, & Gross, 2010) and other scales unrelated to 
the goals of the current study. The questionnaires were administered in small-group 
sessions of about eight people. Gender and age information was also collected. Four 
weeks later, in the second session, participants played the cold CCT in an individual 
setting on a desktop computer, according to the procedure described by Figner et al. 
(2009). Mood state (i.e., PANAS) was assessed before participants played the CCT. 
The experimenter did not know the participants’ scores on the self-report battery. 
 
RESULTS 
To investigate my hypotheses of the relationship between risk taking (average 
number of cards chosen per game round) and habitual use of ER strategies, I 
computed correlations between habitual use of cognitive reappraisal, expressive 
suppression, risk taking, and as covariates, positive and negative mood states. As 
predicted and shown in Table 1, reappraisal and suppression were significantly 
correlated with risk taking, in opposite directions: Stronger habitual use of 
reappraisal was associated with increased risk taking while stronger habitual use of 
suppression was associated with decreased risk taking. 
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Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations among Independent 
Variables and Risk Taking 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Cold CCT 1     
2 ERQ - 
Reappraisal 
 .30* 1    
3 ERQ - 
Suppression 
-.31*  .07 1   
4 Positive Mood  .25
§
  .12 -.36** 1  
5 Negative Mood -.08 -.03   .25
§
 -.01 1 
M (SD) 12.43 (4.85) 25.7 (6.57) 11.5 (4.02) 31.22 (6.16) 18.05 (7.50) 
** p < .001; * p < .05;  
§
 p < .10 
 
These results were confirmed by a single multiple regression model in which 
risk taking was simultaneously regressed on participants’ reappraisal and 
suppression scores (reappraisal: β = .32, p < .05; suppression: β = -.33, p < .05). 
To investigate whether these effects were affected by sex, age, or positive or 
negative mood states, risk taking was used in a hierarchical regression analysis in 
which these covariates (sex, age, mood scores) were entered as the first step in the 
analysis. Reappraisal and suppression were then entered as the second step. As can 
be seen in Table 2, controlling for these covariates effects did not substantially 
change the relationship between ER strategies and risk taking.  
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Table 2. Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Risky Behavior 
 Predictors Measure of risky behavior 
Number of cards chosen in cold CCT 
R²           Adj R²          Model F            df          β 
Step 1 Sex .075        -.006             .928               (4, 46)   .04 
 Age                                                                         .05 
 Positive Mood                                                                         .24 
 Negative Mood                                                                        -.08 
Step 2 ERQ – Reappraisal .220         .113            2.100               (6, 44)  .30* 
 ERQ – Suppression                                                                       -.33* 
      * p < .05 
 
DISCUSSION 
The results of the present study offer evidence that habitual use of different ER 
strategies (cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression) are significant 
predictors of risk taking when predominantly deliberative "cold" cognitive 
processes are involved in the decisions. Importantly, in contrast to earlier work, the 
risky choice task I used triggers mainly deliberative "cold" cognitive decision-
making processes (Figner et al., 2009).  
To the best of my knowledge — there is only other study on the role of both 
cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression in risk taking (Heilman et al., 
2010); but this study investigated effects of ER strategies on incidental emotions 
before taking the risk task. Thus, the results of the present study not only support 
Heilman's (2010) findings (replicating their results of reappraisal and suppression 
on risk taking), but extend them in two ways: First, I show that naturally occurring 
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individual differences in the habitual use of ER strategies (in contrast to 
situationally induced ER strategies) are significant predictors of risk taking, thus 
supporting the ecological validity of the effects of emotion regulation on risk taking 
beyond experimentally induced temporary differences in ER strategies (which was 
the previous studies' approach, e.g., Heilman et al., 2010; Miu & Crisan, 2011). 
Second, I show that ER strategies are significant predictors of risky choice in a task 
that triggers mainly deliberative "cold" cognitive decision-making processes (Figner 
et al., 2009). 
Some limitations of present study need to be acknowledged. First, the evidence 
on the relationship between emotion regulation and risky choice is only 
correlational; accordingly, I cannot rule out that these results have been caused by a 
third variable, related to both emotion regulation and risky choice. This was the 
price I paid for investigating naturally occurring individual differences in ER 
strategies, instead of experimentally manipulating them. Of course, further studies 
are needed in order to underpin causal effect of ER strategies on anticipated 
emotions occurring in making risky choices. 
Second, previous studies (Gross & John, 2003; John & Gross, 2004) have shown 
several links between ER strategies on the one hand and various personality 
characteristics on the other hand, such as openness to experience, neuroticism and 
extraversion, self-esteem, negative affect (e.g. depression), dispositional coping, and 
optimism. It was beyond the scope of the current study to investigate all of these, 
but I cannot rule out that these or other personality dispositions may mediate or 
moderate the results of present study. Gross and John's (2003) study, considering a 
large pool of variables, reported substantial effect sizes for the relationship between 
ER strategies and mood. Therefore, I investigated at least one potential alternative 
explanation, namely that emotion regulation might have affected mood (e.g. Gross 
& John, 2003) and, in turn, mood might have affected risky choice (e.g., Yuen & 
Lee, 2003). To investigate that possibility, I assessed participants' mood before they 
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did the CCT. As I found that risk taking was not significantly associated with mood, 
I can rule out this one potential alternative explanation. Nevertheless, it would be 
interesting to investigate possible pathways by which personality characteristics 
might mediate or moderate the effect of emotion regulation on risky choice. For 
instance, greater reappraisal might increase people's optimism, leading to increased 
risk taking. By contrast, greater suppression might decrease people's optimism, 
leading to decreased risk taking. 
To conclude, these results increase the knowledge about emotion regulation 
theory (Gross & John, 2003) and are also relevant for research lines that rely on 
affective forecasts in decision making processes (e.g., Mellers & McGraw, 2001). 
More broadly speaking, investigations using behavioral risky choice tasks (such as 
the Columbia Card Task; Figner et al., 2009; Figner & Weber, 2011) promise novel 
insights into the connections between emotion regulation and risky behaviors across 
various fields including psychology, economics, and neuroscience (e.g., Schonberg, 
Fox, & Poldrack, 2010). Thus, if during the past decade emotion itself has played an 
important role in decision research, perhaps emotion regulation is bound to play an 
increasingly prominent role in the current decade. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Emotion regulation and risk taking: What happens when people 
focus on negative outcomes? 
 
Every day, people make risky choices using emotion regulation strategies (ER; 
e.g., cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression; Gross & John, 2003) to 
regulate their emotions, but little attention has been paid to the psychological 
mechanisms underlying the relationship between ER strategies and risky choices. 
Previous studies (e.g., John & Gross, 2004) showed that expressive suppression — 
in comparison to cognitive reappraisal — fails to downregulate the experience of 
negative emotions. Thus, the main objective of this experiment was to investigate 
whether and how individuals' negative outcome focus moderates the relation 
between ER strategy and risk taking. I situationally induced either expressive 
suppression or cognitive reappraisal (or, as control, no induction) as ER strategy, 
before participants completed a dynamic risky choice task that triggers integral 
emotions ("hot" Columbia Card Task, CCT; Figner et al., 2009); participants' 
negative outcome focus (EPO; Nenkov et al., 2008) was assessed as individual-
differences measure. Suppressors — in comparison to reappraisors — with a strong 
negative outcome focus showed significantly decreased risk taking, suggesting that 
individuals' negative outcome focus moderates risk taking by exacerbating 
suppression effects in risky decision making.  
 
This chapter is based on Panno, A., Lauriola, M., & Figner, B. (Under Review). 
Emotion regulation and risk taking: What happens when people focus on negative 
outcomes? 
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As a reminder, in the previous decade or so, an influential focus has been the 
study of emotions in decision making, as part of the emotions revolution (Weber & 
Johnson, 2009).  As mentioned in the previous chapter, research pioneered by Gross 
and colleagues (e.g., Gross & John, 2003), has shown that generally people to 
regulate emotions use two common ER strategies: cognitive reappraisal and 
expressive suppression. Reappraisal is the ability to construe a potentially emotion-
eliciting situation in a manner that changes its emotional impact (Lazarus & Alfert, 
1964). E.g., during a card game a person may control her feelings by taking 
different points of view to reformulate the meaning of a situation. In contrast, 
suppression is the ability to inhibit emotion-expressive behavior (Gross, 1998); e.g., 
maintaining a poker-face while bluffing in a card game to inhibit one's own 
emotions. It has been highlighted that several studies investigated the role of ER 
strategies — predominantly cognitive reappraisal — in risky decision making, 
showing that ER strategies can affect risky decisions in various ways, including 
risk-taking levels (Heilman, Cri an, Houser, Miclea, & Miu, 2010; Martin & 
Delgado, 2011; Panno, Lauriola, & Figner, in press), loss aversion, (Sokol-Hessner, 
Camerer, & Phelps 2012), the arousal related to losses (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009), 
and the susceptibility to framing effects (Miu & Crisan, 2011). The role of 
expressive suppression in risky decisions has been studied to a much lesser extent, 
despite its potentially great ecological relevance: Employing an ER strategy of 
expressive suppression, may often lead people to avoid risks and instead choose 
conservatively to reduce the probability of experiencing negative emotions that 
would be triggered by negative outcomes. It is important to note that particularly 
negative outcomes and negative emotions are relevant with respect to expressive 
suppression as it has been shown that expressive suppression specifically fails to 
reduce the experience of negative emotions (e.g., Gross, 1998; Gross &  ohn, 2003; 
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Heilman, Cri an, Houser, Miclea, & Miu, 2010; John & Gross, 2004; Richards & 
Gross, 2000; Vanderhasselt, Baeken, Van Schuerbeek, Luypaert, & De Raedt, 
2012). For example, a recent neuroscience study has shown that reappraisal, but not 
suppression, can successfully downregulate negative emotions (Vanderhasselt et al., 
2012). 
Given the relative lack of knowledge about the role of expressive suppression in 
risky choice and its inability to regulate negative emotions, the first goal of the 
present study was to investigate the relationship between expressive suppression 
and risky choice. To better understand particularly the role of negative emotions 
related to negative potential outcomes, I assessed the moderating role of individual 
differences in how strongly people focus on potential negative outcomes (Nenkov, 
Inman, & Hulland, 2008) as it has been suggested that personality dispositions in 
the "Elaboration on Potential Outcomes" (EPO: Nenkov et al., 2008) influence risky 
behaviors. Indeed, the EPO is considered an important predecision process that lies 
at the heart of self-regulation. Construct's authors (Nenkov et al, 2008) showed that 
decision makers differ in their tendencies to engage in predecision outcome 
elaboration. Thus, the EPO represents a decision maker's generalized predisposition 
toward thinking about actions' consequences and taking into the account these 
consequences at time of decision. Noteworthy, EPO provides information about the 
decisional context making people more conscious of the potential effect of their 
behaviors. Based on this view, it is easy to imagine how the EPO may lead people's 
behavior faced with risky choices. For instance, if decision makers are given a 
choice between different mutual funds, individuals with a relatively strong negative 
outcome focus will invest more in funds with a low risk level as these funds are 
most likely, even in a worst case, to result in only a small loss. This prediction is 
consistent with decision affect theory, which claims that decision makers faced with 
a risky decision are influenced by anticipated emotions triggered by the potential 
outcomes of their choices (Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997): “People who 
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overestimate the displeasure of unfavorable outcomes would tend to be overly risk 
averse” (Mellers & McGraw, 2001, p. 213).  
Combining that (a) suppression leaves intact (i.e., unregulated) the experience of 
negative emotions (John & Gross, 2004), (b) focusing more strongly on negative 
outcomes and emotions increases risk aversion (i.e., Mellers et al., 1997; Nenkov et 
al., 2008), I then predict that individual differences in how strongly they focus on 
negative outcomes will moderate the effect of expressive suppression on risky 
choices, such that inducing expressive suppression will increase risk aversion 
particularly in individuals who strongly focus on negative outcomes. 
In the present study, I was also interested to investigate whether and how 
situationally induced ER strategies affect integral emotions which occur in taking 
risk. In the introduction (i.e., chapter 1) has been pointed out that research 
distinguishes between incidental and integral emotions (see Blanchette & Richards, 
2010, for a review): Incidental emotions are emotions triggered by a source 
unrelated to the current situation, e.g., by inducing an emotional state by showing a 
video clip before the task of interest is administered (Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 
2007). In contrast, integral emotions occur when the emotional state is induced by 
the situation of the task itself, e.g., by positive/negative feedback during the task. In 
the present study, I used a risky-choice task that triggers integral emotions: 
Participants playing the “hot” Columbia Card Task (CCT; Figner, Mackinlay, 
Wilkening, & Weber, 2009; Figner & Voelki, 2004; Figner & Weber, 2011; 
Gladwin, Figner, Crone, & Wiers, 2011) make risky decisions to turn over cards in a 
stepwise manner and receive immediate feedback about their wins or losses. 
Integral emotions are triggered when participants learn about the (good or bad) 
outcomes from their decisions. As a reminder, Heilman and colleagues (2010) 
investigated the effects of induced ER strategies (reappraisal and suppression) on 
risk taking when incidental emotions had to be regulated that were elicited by a 
Predicting Risky Choices 
 
 61 
video clip. They found that reappraisors took significantly greater risks than 
suppressors and controls; no significant differences were found between suppressors 
and controls. To the best my knowledge, it is unknown whether induced ER 
strategies to regulate emotions integral to the risky decisions would equally affect 
risk-taking levels. Accordingly, the second goal of the current study is to investigate 
risky behavior when the situationally induced ER strategies are targeted towards 
emotions integral to the risky decision making task. 
To summarize, the goals of the present study are, first, to investigate whether 
individuals' negative outcome focus moderates the effect of suppression on risky 
choice. The second goal is to investigate the effects of ER strategies on risky 
choices when integral emotions are occurring. These are topics of great relevance as 
it is currently virtually unknown which mechanisms are involved when individuals 
regulate integral emotions during risky decision making, despite the fact that in 
many everyday situations, we need to regulate emotions triggered by the decision-
making process itself.  
 
METHODS 
Participants 
Seventy-four undergraduate students participated in the study (Mage = 21.16, 
SD= 1.86, range 19-28 years; 79% females). They were randomly assigned to 
emotion regulation conditions (reappraisal, suppression, control). 
HOT – Columbia Card Task (CCT). The hot CCT consisted of 24 game rounds 
(Figner & Weber, 2011); each game round starts with 32 cards shown face down 
and a score of 0 points (see Figure 1). Participants' task is to turn over cards 
sequentially by clicking on one card after the other, until they either decide to stop 
or they turn over a loss card. Participants receive immediate feedback whether the 
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chosen card was a gain card or a loss card with points accumulating with each 
turned-over gain card . If they turn over a loss card, the current game round stops 
and they lose the stated amount of points. Across the 24 game rounds, 3 factors are 
systematically varied, (i) probability (out of the 32 cards, 1 or 3 are loss cards), (ii) 
gain amount (each gain card leads to a gain of 10 or 30 points), (iii) loss amount 
8 different combinations, which are each presented 3 times, resulting in the total of 
24 rounds. The indicator of risk taking used here is the average number of cards 
chosen per game round (see also Figner et al., 2009). Participants received a 
variable payment in the form of a prepaid mobile phone card whose amount was 
determined by the outcome of one randomly selected game round (with 1 point = 1 
cent). 
Figure 1 – Hot Version of Columbia Card Task, CCT. Adapted from Figner & Weber 
(2011). 
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Manipulations and Measures 
Emotion Regulation Manipulation. To induce reappraisal versus suppression ER 
strategies, I adopted two brief instructions previously devised from Richards and 
Gross (2000). These instructions have been successfully used to induce reappraisal 
versus suppression across a wide variety of tasks and studies (e.g., Gross, 1998; 
Gross & John, 2003; Richards & Gross, 2000; Heilman et al. 2010). Participants in 
the control condition did not receive any ER strategy instructions. The reappraisal 
instruction was as follows:  
During the game, you may turn over win or loss cards, eliciting feelings. Please 
remember that during the game, it is important to take different points of view in 
order to control your feelings. You can do this by changing the way you look at the 
situation in which you are.  
The suppression instruction was as follows: 
During the game, you may turn over win or loss cards, eliciting feelings. We 
would like to see how well you can control your facial expressions. Therefore, it is 
very important to us that you try your best to adopt a neutral facial expression. To 
do this, we would like for you to keep your facial muscles from moving. So play, but 
please try to keep your facial muscles still so that you don't make any expressions at 
all.  
 
Elaboration on potential outcomes. The "Elaboration on Potential Outcomes" 
questionnaire (EPO: Nenkov et al., 2008) is a 13-item measure assessing negative 
focus, positive focus, and general focus on potential outcomes. The negative focus 
subscale measures the extent to which an individual focuses on the possible 
negative outcomes (e.g., “I often worry about what could go wrong as a result of my 
decisions”). Likewise, the positive focus subscale measures the extent to which an 
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individual focuses on the possible positive outcomes (e.g. “When thinking over my 
decisions I focus more on their positive end results”). The generation subscale 
measures the extent to which an individual generates different outcomes of their 
own choices (e.g., “Before I make a decision I consider all possible outcomes”). The 
psychometric properties of the EPO scale have been found to be satisfactory with 
alpha reliabilities averaging .87 for the negative focus subscale, .87 for the positive 
focus subscale, and .88 for the generation subscale (Nenkov et al., 2008). Consistent 
with these findings, internal consistency in this sample was .93, .85, and .92 for 
negative focus, positive focus and generation, respectively.    
Procedure 
Participants first completed the EPO questionnaire, then were given the ER-
strategy instructions, then played the hot CCT. Finally, participants answered four 
self-report items as ER manipulation-check, derived from Gross and  ohn’s (2003) 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (e.g., for reappraisal: “During the game, I 
controlled my emotions by changing the way I thought about the situation I was in;” 
for suppression: “During the game, I controlled my emotions by not expressing 
them”). 
RESULTS 
Manipulation check. Two one-way ANOVAs showed that participants used the 
strategy they were instructed to use: Reappraisal vs. suppression vs. control 
conditions differed significantly on the reappraisal and the suppression 
manipulation-check scores, F(2, 71) = 8.19, p < .001; F(2, 71) = 7.36, p < .001, 
respectively (see Table 1). 
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Table 1. Self-Reported Use and Cronbach Alpha of Cognitive Reappraisal and 
Expressive Suppression in the hot CCT (manipulation-check scores). 
Experimental Conditions Reappraisal M (SD) Suppression M (SD) 
Reappraisors 4.60 (± 1.73)a 2.97 (± 1.26)a 
Suppressors 2.93 (± 1.37)b 4.37 (± 1.38)b 
Controls 3.46 (± 1.23)c 3.42 (± 1.21)c 
Cronbach Alpha (Items) α = .79 (2) α = .70 (2) 
Subscripts indicate mean differences tested with post-hoc comparisons: For 
reappraisal score, a vs. b – p < .001; a vs. c – p < .01. For suppression score, b vs. a 
– p < .001; b vs. c – p < .05. All other post-hoc comparisons were non-significant. 
 
Risk taking. To investigate my hypotheses, a 3 (ER: reappraisal vs. suppression 
average number of card chosen was carried out. The results showed that there was a 
significant main effect of ER strategies on risk, F(2, 68) = 3.60, p < .05, η2 = .09. 
Post-hoc analyses showed that suppressors chose significantly less cards than 
reappraisors (suppressors vs. reappraisors, p < .01); while the other pairwise 
comparisons were not significant (reappraisors vs. controls, p = .30; suppressors vs. 
controls, p = .12). No significant main effect of negative outcome focus on risky 
choices was found (p = .12). However, as expected, there was a significant 
interaction between ER strategy and negative outcome focus, F(2, 68) = 3.40, p < 
.05, η2 = .09. As can be seen in Figure 2, suppressors took less risks than 
reappraisors only among participants with a strong negative outcome focus (p < 
.01), the other pairwise comparisons were not significant (all p's > .1). The other 
EPO subscales showed no significant main effects or interaction on risky choices 
(all p's > .1). As the used median split on the negative outcome focus scale could 
lead to spurious results, I also conducted an ANCOVA with negative focus as 
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continuous covariate (DeCoster, Iselin, & Gallucci, 2009). As both analyses yielded 
the same results, I report only the ANOVA results. 
 
Figure 2. Risk taking (average number of cards chosen) as a function of ER-
Strategy (reappraisors/suppressors/controls) and negative outcome focus 
(low/high).  
 
DISCUSSION 
The findings of present study show that the strength of individuals' negative 
outcome focus in decision making is a significant moderator of the effect that ER 
strategy has on risky behavior. Consistent with — and extending — previous studies 
(e.g., Heilman et al., 2010; Panno et al., in press), we found that ER strategies also 
affect risky choices when integral emotions are involved. Decision research (e.g., 
Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Mellers 
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& McGraw, 2001) highlighted the role of emotions in risky choices, but only 
recently has it started paying attention to their regulation. Most of these — still few 
— studies focused on reappraisal (e.g., Martin & Delgado, 2011; Sokol-Hessner et 
al., 2009; Sokol-Hessner, Camerer, & Phelps 2012).   
The question of the current study, whether and how a habitual use of negative 
outcome focus may interact with a situationally induced ER strategy in risky 
decisions, has not been addressed in the literature and the present results clarify the 
role of ER strategies in risky choice in several ways. First, as a reminder, 
suppression is conceptualized as a behavioral ER strategy; i.e., it consists of 
“changing the way one responds behaviorally to an emotion-eliciting event” ( ohn 
& Gross, 2004, p. 1301). In other words, suppressors attempt to downregulate 
negative emotions by adopting specific behavioral patterns (e.g., Gross, 1998; Gross 
& John, 2003), for example by avoiding situations that could potentially elicit 
negative emotions (see Gross & John, 2003, for more details). This fits very well 
with results of present study as I observed that suppressors made less risky choices 
than reappraisors, leading them to a reduced chance of encountering losses (which 
would trigger negative emotions). Thus, it is tempting to speculate that suppressors 
were risk averse because – by adopting a risk averse behavior  – they attempt to 
avoid the experience of negative emotions which could be triggered by negative 
potential outcomes, (e.g., Gross, 1998; Gross & John, 2003; Heilman et al., 2010; 
John & Gross, 2004; Vanderhasselt et al., 2012). This mechanism would seem to be 
particularly relevant and powerful in individuals with a strong negative outcome 
focus, as this personality variable is presumed to exacerbate one’s attention to 
negative outcomes — an interaction effect that I indeed observed in the present 
data. In sum, this study shows evidence for such an exacerbation due to the co-
occurrence of two specific circumstances, namely the first, the reliance on 
expressive suppression as ER strategy and, second, having a strong negative 
outcome focus. Vice versa, these results suggest that situationally induced 
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suppression does not always necessarily increase risk aversion, as I observed that 
reappraisors, suppressors, and controls exhibited identical levels of risk among 
participants with a low negative outcome focus.   
Second, the present findings support and extend previous studies that 
investigated the role of ER strategies in incidental (Heilman et al., 2010) and 
anticipated (Panno et al., in press) emotions, as I here show that ER strategies also 
affect risky choices in a task that was specifically developed to elicit integral 
emotions.  
To conclude, present study's findings shed light on decision research outcomes 
and are also relevant for emotion research. For instance, decision research has 
shown that the impact of negative outcomes on emotions is stronger than the impact 
of equally-sized positive outcomes (often discussed in terms of loss aversion; e.g., 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1991; see also Yechiam & Hochman, in press). Accordingly, 
negative emotions may be stronger and thus harder to control than positive 
emotions during decision making. These results are consistent with this idea, but 
further studies are needed to investigate these speculations, e.g., whether and how a 
powerful ER strategy, such as reappraisal may influence the effects of negative 
emotions on risky behaviors. The results of the present study are also relevant to 
and can extend predictions of decision affect theory (Mellers et al., 1997): This 
theory posits that the overestimation of displeasure leads individuals to be overly 
risk averse. Based on this study, there is evidence that expressive suppression may 
play a key role in the relation between negative outcome focus and risky choice, as I 
find a joint effect of suppression and strong negative focus. Thus, future theories 
that rely on affective forecasts in decision making (e.g., Mellers et al., 1997) may 
benefit from taking into account decision makers' ER strategies to better explain 
risky behaviors. 
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Finally, I would suggest that in general more attention should be paid to 
suppression as ER strategy. Often in our lives, we regulate decision-related 
emotions via suppression: For example, we may avoid to speak about our own idea 
in a work meeting because we are afraid of co-workers' potentially negative 
judgments. Thus, better understanding the role of suppression in decision making 
could have important applied implications in a wide range of situations. Further, 
using training to replace one ER strategy (e.g., suppression) by an alternative, better 
ER strategy (e.g., reappraisal) may benefit decisions across a broad range of 
domains and may have the effect that people can avoid disadvantageous choices by 
changing their decision processes and the regulation of the involved emotions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
General discussion and summary of findings 
“It is apparent that specific emotions are important, frequently occurring 
elements of everyday experience” (Brief & Weiss, 2002, p. 297). Broadly speaking, 
people daily make thousands of choices which include several activities ranging 
from whether taking a public transport or their own car to go to work to whether (or 
not) taking a flu shot. These choices involve greater or lesser risk-taking level. 
Accordingly, each of these choices also engenders several types of emotions which 
could be positive or negative, pre-decisional or post-decisional (Mellers & 
MacGraw, 2001). People decisions depend on previous experience (i.e., memories) 
and cognition but also on current emotional state (Phelps, 2006). It is also likely that 
post-decisional emotions may in turn affect the next choice; though it is unrelated to 
previous choice domain. What role do emotions have in risky decision-making 
processes? Where emotions arise? How do personality dispositions affect the 
experience of emotions in risk taking? How do situational cues affect decision 
makers' emotions faced with a risky choice?  
Surely, emotions play a relevant functional role in decision-making processes, 
but in so doing, they also affect these processes (e.g., Loewenstein et al., 2001). In 
the present work, driven by interest in these issues, I attempt to shed light on 
mechanisms underlying the relationship between emotions and risky choices, but 
mainly I attempt to extend the knowledge on these processes taking into account 
some motivational and emotion-regulation factors which affect the experience of 
emotion when the decision maker is faced with risky choices. Furthermore, I was 
also motivated in underpinning the relationships between emotion and decision 
research. 
In the chapter 2, I was stimulated by previous findings (Pierro et al., 2008) 
which showed how regulatory modes (i.e., in the form of a personality dispositions 
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or momentarily, i.e., situationally induced) affected the experience of post-
decisional regret. Based on this evidence, I hypothesized that likewise regulatory 
modes affected the experience of anticipated regret. Combining this hypothesis with 
previous findings (see also Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007), which  showed a strong 
relationship between anticipated regret and risky choices, I then hypothesized that 
regulatory modes may affect the experience of anticipated regret, which in turn, 
affect human risky decision making. It is worth nothing that, the series of three 
experiment presented in the chapter 2 pointed out two relevant novel findings: First, 
they show that decision maker's regulatory mode (as personality disposition and 
situationally induced) affect risk-taking level. Second, the present findings show 
that this relationship is mediated by the experience of anticipated regret. Based on 
this latter finding, we may highlight the trajectory of anticipated regret when a 
decision maker is faced with risky choices. 
Recent evidence on emotion regulation (ER) have shown that humans typically 
make efforts to control emotion experiences (Gross & John, 2003). This issue opens 
the possibility that people's ER strategies modulate the effect of acute emotions in 
making risky decisions. Accordingly, this raises the additional possibility that 
different people's regulation strategies could have different implications for 
decisions. I want to emphasize this latter point, because it shifts the research focus 
from studying of the effects of emotions on decision-making to studying the 
strategies which people adopt to regulate the experience of these emotions, thereby 
marking – in my view – an important step forward in understanding the mechanisms 
underlying the human risky behaviors. 
Based on a number of evidences (e.g., Heilman, Cri an, Houser, Miclea, & Miu, 
2010; Martin & Delgado, 2011; Miu & Crisan, 2011; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; 
Sokol-Hessner, Camerer, & Phelps 2012) in the chapter 3, I hypothesized that ER 
strategies affect risky decision making not only in risk-taking processes which 
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involve high emotional arousal; but also – and perhaps more interestingly – they 
also affect human risky decision making under deliberative processes. In the present 
chapter is crucial to hypothesize that deliberative processes are not free from 
emotions, because emotions occur in a “cold” form, such as anticipated emotions 
(i.e., by lower emotional arousal level). Thus, findings of this experiment extend 
previous literature (e.g., Heilman, et al., 2010; Miu & Crisan, 2011) in two ways: 
First, I showed that people's ER strategies also affect risky behavior under 
deliberative processes. Second, I showed that not only situationally induced (i.e., 
Heilman et al., 2010) ER strategies affect human decision under risk but also 
naturally occurring (i.e., personality disposition) ER strategies affect people's risky 
choices. 
In the chapter 4, I was particularly focused on the gap between emotion research 
and decision research. On the one hand, we have empirical evidence about how ER 
strategies affect risky choices (Heilman et al., 2010; Miu & Crisan, 2011). On the 
another hand, we know that choices' potential outcomes trigger positive or negative 
emotions which lead to the decision maker behavior (Mellers et al., 1997). 
Furthermore, Tversky and Kahneman (1991) showed that negative outcomes have a 
stronger impact on experience of emotions than equally-sized positive outcomes. 
Keeping in mind that suppression leaves intact (i.e., unregulated) the experience of 
negative emotions (John & Gross, 2004); and combining this latter finding with 
previous decision research's findings (i.e., Mellers et al., 1997; Nenkov et al., 2008; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1991), I then hypothesized a moderator effect of the habitual 
use of negative outcome focus (see also Nenkov et al., 2008 and chapter 4, for more 
details) when suppression is induced. Findings of this chapter extend previous 
research on emotion and decision research in two ways: First, I showed that 
personality dispositions in negative outcome focus exacerbates the suppression's 
effect in taking risky choices. Second, I showed that ER strategies also affect 
integral emotions which occur in making risky decisions as well as incidental 
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emotions (Heilman et al., 2010) and anticipated emotions (Panno et al., in press).  
Future Directions 
Based on the findings reported in chapter 2, we concluded that regulatory mode 
affects anticipated regret, which in turn, affects risk-taking level. In keeping with 
this view, further studies are needed to investigate whether and how different types 
of anticipated emotions may affect people's risky choices. For instance, researchers 
may extend the literature on this topic investigating whether specific emotions of 
the same valence but triggering different arousal level (i.e., anger and fear) may also 
mediate the relationship between regulatory modes and risky choices. For example, 
assessors faced with risky choices may engage negative emotions with a lower 
arousal level (i.e., fear). By contrast, locomotors may engage always negative 
emotions but triggering a higher arousal level (i.e., anger). Furthermore, future 
studies are needed to understand how regulatory modes affect human decisions 
under risk when these are positively or negatively framed. For example, the 
assessment mode may affect people's risky choices by opposite pathways whether 
risky choices are framed via gain or loss domain. More specifically, as stated by 
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), people are more risk averse when a 
risky decision is framed in terms of potential gains; while, they are more risk 
seeking when the same decision is framed in terms of losses. In this framework, a 
specific regulatory mode, such as locomotion, may reduce the susceptibility to the 
framing effect in making risky decisions.  
Furthermore, futures studies are needed to investigate the gain, loss, probability 
amount sensitivity of regulatory modes when risky choices occurring in decision-
making processes. To address this issue, Schonberg and colleagues suggest to adopt 
paradigms, which allow for decomposition and analysis in terms of cognitive and 
economic primitives (e.g., magnitude of gains and losses, probabilities). This latter 
issue has a high potential explanatory to shed light on mechanisms underlying the 
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relationship between goal-oriented self-regulation and risk taking (Schonberg, Fox, 
& Poldrack, 2010, p. 6). 
We could make several speculations by combining regulatory mode theory with  
emotion regulation theory. One may claim that assessors and locomotors adopt 
different emotion regulation strategies when they are faced with risky choices. For 
example, since assessors are afraid to fail a decision, they may adopt the 
suppression strategy because they need to exclude negative emotions from 
decisional processes (i.e., they need to make more “cold” these processes). By 
contrast, locomotors may adopt the reappraisal strategy because they generally 
focus on positive outcomes (Kruglansky et al., 2000); and accordingly, they are 
more suitable to take into account positive emotions in making risky decisions. 
Based on these speculations, on the one hand; we can hypothesize that different 
regulatory mode orientations are associated with different emotion regulation 
strategy. On the another hand, we know that different emotion regulation strategies 
affect risk taking by opposite directions (Panno et al., in press). Thus, we may 
hypothesize that assessors engage the suppression strategy, which in turn, decreases 
risk-taking level (i.e., these relationships may be explained by assessors' fear to 
make the wrong decision). By contrast, locomotors engage the reappraisal strategy, 
which in turn, increases risk-taking level (i.e., this relationship may be explained by 
locomotors' need to move from state to state searching positive outcomes). 
In the next paragraph, I focus on some hypotheses which might increase the 
knowledge about mechanisms underlying the relationship between emotion 
regulation strategies and human risky behavior. 
John and Gross (2004) also pointed out that suppression — in comparison to 
reappraisal — strategy fails to downregulate negative emotions but not positive 
emotions. Thus, we may hypothesize that integral emotions might mediate the 
relationship between ER strategies and risky choices. For example, situationally 
Predicting Risky Choices 
 
 76 
induced suppression might do not be suitable to decrease people's negative integral 
emotions, which in turn, might affect their risk taking (see Blanchette & Richards, 
2010, for a review). By contrast, situationally induced reappraisal might be suitable 
to decrease people's negative integral emotions withdrawing their effect on risky 
choices. Thus, future studies are needed to elaborate implications of this asymmetric 
process in human decisions under risk. Future researches are also needed to shed 
light on autonomic nervous system's mechanisms involved in making risky choices 
which trigger integral emotions; for example, assessing the participants' skin 
conductance during the risk task. Neuroscience studies may also show brain 
mechanisms involved in these decisional processes (e.g., Schonberg, Fox, & 
Poldrack, 2010; Vanderhasselt, Baeken, Van Schuerbeek, Luypaert, & De Raedt, 
2012). 
Combining some cognitive functions, such as working memory, which is related 
to emotion regulation (i.e., Richards & Gross, 2000) and decision research we may 
increase the understanding about mechanisms underlying these processes. For 
example, we know that suppression — but not reappraisal — impaired working 
memory during information processing (Richards & Gross, 2000). Accordingly, 
suppression, by impairing working memory during information processing, might 
affect decision making. Thus, future studies could investigate whether cognitive 
variables, such as memory function might moderate the effect of emotion regulation 
strategies on decision making. 
Consistent with this theoretical framework, which points out the role of emotions 
in making risky decision (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; 
Lopes, 1987; Lopes & Oden, 1999; Mellers et al., 1997); we have both empirical 
and theoretical motives to consider that future theories that rely on affective 
forecasts in decision making (e.g., Mellers et al., 1997) should include emotion 
regulation strategies and motivational variables to increase their explanatory power. 
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It is an intriguing challenge for future studies. 
Summary of findings 
In the following paragraph, I summarize the most important contributions put 
forward in this work. For each chapter will be highlighted novel findings outlined. 
On the one hand, the findings of the present studies shed light on emotional 
processes underlying human decisions under risk. On the another hand, they shed 
light on both regulatory mode theory and emotion regulation theory. In sum, these 
findings extend our knowledge in five ways:  
First, they show how decision maker's self-regulatory mode (i.e., assessment and 
locomotion) affect people's risky choices (i.e., chapter 2). More specifically, I find 
that assessment mode – in comparison to locomotion mode – lead to decreased risk-
taking level. It is worth nothing that, these tendencies have been shown in both 
habitual use and situationally induced of regulatory modes. 
Second, they show the trajectory of anticipated regret in making decisions under 
risk (i.e., chapter 2). In particular, I show that assessment mode increases the regret 
emotion, which in turn, decreases risk-taking level. By contrast, locomotion mode 
decreases the regret emotion, which in turn, increases risk-taking level. 
Third, they show that habitual use of emotion regulation strategies (i.e., 
cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression) predict individual differences in 
taking risk under deliberative processes (i.e., chapter 3). More specifically, 
cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression were significantly correlated with 
risk taking, in opposite directions: Stronger habitual use of reappraisal was 
associated with increased risk taking while stronger habitual use of suppression was 
associated with decreased risk taking. 
Four, they show how situationally induced emotion regulation strategies affect 
people's risky choices which involve higher arousal levels (e.g., when occurring 
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integral emotions; i.e., chapter 4). In particular, situationally induced suppression 
ER strategy—compared to reappraisal—significantly decreases risk taking only 
among people with a higher negative outcome focus. 
Five, based on chapter 4's findings it is showed that habitual use of negative 
outcome focus on risky choice moderates the expressive suppression's effect in 
human decisions under risk. 
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Appendix A 
Psychometric Measures 
 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 
Regulatory Mode Questionnaire 
Elaboration on Potential Outcome Scale 
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Emotion Regulation Questionnaire: ERQ Italian version 
 
Qui di seguito, ti chiediamo di rispondere ad alcune domande sulla tua 
esperienza emotiva, in particolare riguardo al modo in cui controlli (cioè regoli 
e gestisci) le tue emozioni. Le domande comprendono due diversi aspetti circa 
le tue emozioni. Il primo aspetto riguarda la tua esperienza, ovvero quello che 
provi, senti dentro. Il secondo riguarda invece l’espressione, cioè il modo in cui 
mostri le tue emozioni nel modo di parlare, esprimerti, comportarti.  
Nonostante alcune domande ti sembreranno simili, in realtà esse differiscono 
per alcuni aspetti importanti. Ti chiediamo quindi di leggere con attenzione e 
di rispondere alla sinistra dell’affermazione utilizzando questa scala di valori:  
 
______1 Per sentirmi meglio (ad esempio, felice/contento/sollevato/di buon umore), 
cerco di guardare le cose da una prospettiva diversa.  
______2 Tengo i miei sentimenti per me.  
______3 Per non starci male (ad esempio, essere triste/in collera/di cattivo umore), 
cerco di guardare le cose da una prospettiva diversa.  
______4 Quando sono contento/felice, cerco di non farlo notare.  
______5 Quando devo affrontare una situazione difficile, cerco di considerarla da 
una prospettiva che mi aiuti a stare calmo/a.  
______6 Controllo le mie emozioni non esprimendole.  
______7 Cambiare il modo di pensare ad una situazione, mi aiuta a sentirmi meglio.  
______8 Cerco di controllare i miei sentimenti provando a cambiare il modo di 
considerare la situazione in cui mi trovo.  
______9 Se provo sentimenti negativi, faccio attenzione a non esprimerli.  
______10 Cambiare il modo di pensare ad una situazione, mi aiuta a non starci 
male.  
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Regulatory Mode Questionnaire: RMQ Italian version  
 
____1. Non mi dispiace fare qualcosa anche se richiede uno sforzo ulteriore. 
____2. Sono uno stacanovista del lavoro. 
____3. Mi sento eccitato quando sono in prossimità di raggiungere un obiettivo. 
____4. Mi piace fare le cose attivamente piuttosto che stare semplicemente a 
guardare e fare da spettatore. 
____5. Sono una persona fattiva (che agisce). 
____6. Quando porto a termine un progetto spesso aspetto un po' prima di iniziarne 
un altro. 
____7. Quando decido di fare qualcosa non vedo l'ora di cominciare. 
____8. Nel momento in cui completo un compito ho già in mente il successivo. 
____9. Sono una persona poco energica. 
____10. Per la maggior parte del tempo i miei pensieri sono occupati dal compito 
che desidero realizzare. 
____11. Quando comincio a fare qualcosa di solito persevero finché non la finisco. 
____12. Sono una persona intraprendente. 
____13. Non do mai una valutazione delle mie interazioni sociali con altri dopo che 
hanno avuto luogo. 
____14. Passo molto tempo a fare una lista delle mie caratteristiche positive e 
negative. 
____15. Mi piace valutare i progetti delle altre persone. 
____16. Spesso mi paragono ad altre persone. 
____17. Non passo molto tempo a pensare ai modi in cui gli altri potrebbero 
migliorare se stessi. 
____18. Spesso critico sia i lavori che faccio io che quelli fatti dagli altri. 
____19. Spesso sento che gli altri mi stanno giudicando. 
____20. Sono una persona portata a rilevare errori ed imperfezioni. 
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____21. Quando parlo, sono molto critico rispetto a quello che dico. 
____22. Spesso penso che le scelte e le decisioni degli altri sono sbagliate. 
____23. Raramente analizzo le conversazioni che ho avuto con altri una volta che 
esse si sono concluse. 
____24. Quando incontro una persona nuova di solito la valuto sotto diversi punti di 
vista (ad esempio l'aspetto estetico, il successo, il livello sociale, l'abbigliamento). 
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Elaboration on Potential Outcomes: EPO Italian version 
____1. Prima di agire considero cosa guadagnerò o perderò in futuro come risultato 
delle mie azioni. 
____2. Provo ad anticipare mentalmente il maggior numero di conseguenze 
possibili delle mie            azioni. 
____3. Prima di prendere una decisione considero tutti i possibili risultati. 
____4. Provo sempre a valutare quanto potrebbero essere importanti le potenziali 
conseguenze delle mie azioni. 
____5. Mi impegno molto nel predire quanto siano probabili le differenti 
conseguenze di una decisione. 
____6. Di solito valuto con cura il rischio dei vari risultati che si presenteranno. 
____7. Ho come una sensazione positiva che le cose andranno sempre per il meglio 
____8. Preferisco pensare alle cose buone che possono succedere piuttosto che a 
quelle cattive 
____9. Ripensando alle mie decisioni mi focalizzo di più sul lato positivo dei 
risultati ottenuti. 
____10. Tendo a pensare molto sugli esiti negativi che potrebbero verificarsi come 
un risultato delle mie azioni. 
____11. Spesso ho il timore che le cose potrebbero andare a finire male. 
____12. Ripensando alle mie decisioni mi focalizzo di più sul lato negativo dei 
risultati ottenuti. 
____13. Mi preoccupo spesso su cosa potrebbe andar male come un risultato delle 
mie decisioni. 
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Appendix B 
Experimental Manipulations 
 
Regulatory Modes: Assessment, Locomotion 
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Assessment Manipulation: Italian Version 
 
Ricerca sui ricordi personali 
Ti chiediamo di ricordare tre diversi comportamenti che tu hai messo in atto con 
successo nel passato e di scrivere una breve descrizione di ciascun comportamento. 
Si tratta di comportamenti che tutte le persone adottano nella vita quotidiana. In 
particolare ti chiediamo di fornire un breve esempio di ciascuno dei seguenti tre tipi 
di comportamento. 
 
 
Pensa alle occasioni nelle quali hai paragonato te stesso ad altre persone 
 
 
Pensa alle occasioni nelle quali ti sei soffermato a riflettere sulle tue caratteristiche 
positive e negative 
 
Pensa alle occasioni nelle quali hai criticato i lavori fatti da te stesso e quelli fatti 
dagli altri 
 
 
 
Locomotion Manipulation: Italian Version 
 
Ricerca sui ricordi personali 
Ti chiediamo di ricordare tre diversi comportamenti che tu hai messo in atto con 
successo nel passato e di scrivere una breve descrizione di ciascun comportamento. 
Si tratta di comportamenti che tutte le persone adottano nella vita quotidiana. In 
particolare ti chiediamo di fornire un breve esempio di ciascuno dei seguenti tre tipo 
di comportamento. 
 
 
Pensa alle occasioni nelle quali ti sei comportato come una persona attiva. 
 
 
Pensa alle occasioni nelle quali avevi appena completato un progetto e ne hai 
iniziato subito un altro 
 
 
Pensa alle occasioni nelle quali avevi deciso di fare qualcosa e non vedevi l’ora di 
cominciare 
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